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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees a right to jury trial in most civil cases in federal courts.  It 
provides that: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.1 
This language—the use of the word “preserved” and the reference to 
the common law—invokes history, but the precise role of history has 
been the subject of considerable controversy and inconsistency over 
the last two centuries.  Interpreting the Seventh Amendment, the 
courts have made two important distinctions: that between law and 
equity on the one hand, and that between law and fact on the other.  
The historical right to a civil jury in England existed for cases brought 
in common law courts, as opposed to courts of equity, and the right 
extended to questions of fact, not questions of law.2 
The Court has been most consistent in honoring historical forms 
when distinguishing between law and equity, though it has not been 
entirely faithful to history even there.  But when it comes to 
distinguishing between law and fact, the record is much more 
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difficult to interpret.  This distinction has long been a difficult one,3 
possibly because the kinds of questions that come up in trials do not 
divide neatly into two categories.  There are pure questions of law, 
pure questions of fact, mixed questions of law and fact, ultimate facts, 
and perhaps others.4  It has been suggested that the law/fact 
distinction is nothing but a mask for a policy decision about which 
questions should be given to the judge and which to the jury.5  This 
distinction, however, does have Constitutional significance.  It 
deserves another look, at least in part, because the Supreme Court 
has recently invoked it in a context that raises questions about the 
entire history of that distinction in Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
In 1996, the Court decided Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc.,6 a patent case in which the issue was how one should interpret a 
patent claim.7  The Court noted that previous decisions had relied on 
distinctions between law and fact or between substance and 
procedure to determine what issues go to the jury,8 but asserted that 
the “sounder course” was to use the “historical method.”9  Looking to 
eighteenth century English cases, the Court found that, while the 
cases were ambiguous, judges rather than juries generally interpreted 
patent specifications—the rough equivalent of the modern claim—
and that, in any event, there was an established rule that judges, not 
 
 3 Much has been written on the law/fact distinction.  See, e.g., WILLIAM FORSYTH, 
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 216-48 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1994) (1875); LEON 
GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 268-79 (1930); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF NEW TRIALS 
(1866); JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRIES BY A JURY (1873); SIR 
JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 15-18 (1920); JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY 
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 183-262 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969) 
(1898); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 
(1924); Frederick J. de Slovere, The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of 
Statutes, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1933); Jabez Fox, Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545 
(1899); Frederick Green, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 15 HARV. L. REV. 271 
(1901); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1922); Fleming 
James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949); J. 
Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1985); 
Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); 
Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867 
(1966); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact, or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1986). 
 4 For a discussion of some of these categories, see SWARD, supra note 2, at 272-73. 
 5 See Fox, supra note 3, at 551; see also Isaacs, supra note 3, at 4; Weiner, supra 
note 3, at 1868. 
 6 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 7 See id. at 373-74.  A claim is the part of the patent that describes the invention. 
 8 See id. at 378. 
 9 Id. 
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juries, interpreted written documents.10  Further, finding no reason in 
“existing precedent,” in “the relative interpretive skills of judges and 
juries,” or in the “statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the 
allocation,”11 the Court held that there is no right to have a jury 
interpret the claim in a patent.12 
This case could be confined to its facts, of course, and apply only 
to the interpretation of claims in patents, but its language was 
broader than that.  If we are now to look to history in defining fact 
and law, it is worth examining how that history might affect current 
practices.  That examination, it turns out, is quite telling.  Over the 
nation’s history, the Court has approved a variety of tests and 
procedural devices that, collectively, have changed our definition of 
fact and law.  Specifically, some issues that quite clearly would have 
been classified as “fact” and given to juries in eighteenth century 
England are now classified as “law” and given to the judge to decide.  
In this article, I will trace that transformation.  The earliest and most 
important development was the rejection of the so-called “scintilla” 
test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of the 
“reasonable jury” test.  The cases show that what is “reasonable” is 
often in the eyes of the beholder, meaning that the new test gives 
judges more power.  Court approval of three new procedural devices 
whose contours were refined in the twentieth century—summary 
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict—also gave judges more power.  The latter two are now 
collectively called judgment as a matter of law,13 but I will use the 
older terms in this article to emphasize their separate development. 
In Part II of this article I will present a brief description of the 
history and structure of the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees 
the right to a jury trial in certain civil cases.  Part III then discusses 
how law and fact have been defined in English and American legal 
history, using the development of the reasonable jury test, directed 
verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and summary 
judgment as anchors.  This discussion shows that, for the most part, 
courts have moved toward defining as “law” some matters that would 
have been called “fact” at the time the Seventh Amendment was 
 
 10 See id. at 380-82. 
 11 Id. at 384. 
 12 517 U.S. at 391. 
 13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.  The 
purpose of this change in terminology was to underline the fact that a directed 
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were judged by the same test as 
summary judgment.  Id.  The summary judgment rule also uses the term “judgment 
as a matter of law.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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ratified.  The effect of this is that judges now decide some issues that 
juries would have decided at the time of the Seventh Amendment’s 
ratification.  In Part IV, I complete the historical development by 
discussing Markman in more detail and speculating on its import.  I 
conclude that if the Court is serious about using history to define law 
and fact, it will have to revisit the constitutionality of the reasonable 
jury test, the directed verdict, the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and the summary judgment. 
II.  THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 
Before we can understand the effect Markman might have on the 
law/fact distinction, it is important to understand how history has 
been used in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.  In this section I 
will first describe briefly the English and American origins of the 
Seventh Amendment.  I then turn to a brief description of how 
history has been used in the analysis of the two distinctions that the 
Seventh Amendment draws: that between law and equity, and that 
between law and fact. 
A.  Origins 
1.  The English Origins 
The civil jury is an English institution, imported to the American 
colonies by English immigrants.14  The English jury dates to shortly 
after the Norman Conquest of 1066, and is generally thought to be a 
Norman import.15  Originally, the jury was an inquisitorial device, 
whereby citizens from the neighborhood where the dispute arose 
were summoned to tell the court what happened.16  If the summoned 
jurors did not know what had happened they were required to make 
inquiries and then swear in court as to the facts.17  Over several 
centuries, the jury evolved to its present form, in which jurors are 
expected to know nothing about the matter except what they hear in 
 
 14 A more detailed history of the civil jury appears in SWARD, supra note 2, at ch. 
2.  Perhaps the best general history of the jury is found in THAYER, supra note 3.  For 
additional sources, see LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956); FORSYTH, supra 
note 3; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 135-46 (1903); THEODORE 
F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 106-38 (1956); 1 FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 138-46 (1898). 
 15 See JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 119-20 (1960); see also FORSYTH, 
supra note 3, at 45-77; PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 107-09; R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE 
BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 73-79 (1988). 
 16 See THAYER, supra note 3, at 54 
 17 See id. 
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court.18  Trials in substantially modern form apparently occurred by 
the end of the fifteenth century,19 but jurors were permitted to base 
their decisions on personal knowledge as late as 1670.20  By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, however, jurors were forbidden to 
base their decisions on personal knowledge.21 
At the time of the American Revolution, there were two 
significant limits on the scope of the English civil jury’s authority.  
First, the jury was confined to the common law courts and did not 
operate at all in courts of equity.  Courts of equity developed because 
the rigid rules and procedures of the common law courts sometimes 
prevented those courts from doing justice.22  While the jurisdiction of 
courts of equity was limited by the doctrine that equity could act only 
if the remedy in the common law courts was inadequate,23 the courts 
of equity still had substantial authority, including the power to enjoin 
common law proceedings under some circumstances.24  The primary 
remedy in common law courts was money damages.25  Courts of 
equity handled nearly everything else, including injunctions, 
 
 18 See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judges of Proofs: The 
Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201 (1988). 
 19 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 14, at 129-30. 
 20 See Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670); see also Mitnick, 
supra note 18, at 203-07.  Most of the English cases cited in this article were reported 
initially by individual reporters and collected in reports bearing their names.  These 
so-called nominal reports were collected in the English Reports.  I give both citations 
in this article, but I have consulted only the English Reports. 
 21 See Mitnick, supra note 18, at 207 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 374-75 (1768)).  The case that established 
this was apparently Dormer v. Parkhurst, Andr. 315, 95 Eng. Rep. 414 (K.B. 1738).  See 
Mitnick, supra note 18, at 226. 
 22 See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 1-28 (2d ed. 1937); see also 1 
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 16-23 (Spencer W. 
Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).  The jury also did not operate in admiralty courts. 
 23 See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES – EQUITY – RESTITUTION 
§ 2.1(1) (2d ed. 1993). 
 24 A court of equity could enjoin a common law proceeding if the court of equity 
already had jurisdiction over the matter.  See SWARD, supra note 2, at 159.  This 
prevented multiple suits on the same matter.  See id.  A court of equity could also 
enjoin a person from instituting multiple common law proceedings on the same 
matter, or from threatening to do so.  See id.  A court of equity acted to prevent 
irreparable harm, and it was thought that having to litigate multiple suits arising out 
of the same matter would cause irreparable harm.  See id. at 159-60. 
 25 See JOHN E. CRIBBET, JUDICIAL REMEDIES 36 (Erwin N. Griswold ed., 1954).  
Common law courts could also order the recovery of real and personal property 
through such claims as ejectment and replevin.  See 1 POMEROY, supra note 22, at 
§109.  They also handled a variety of extraordinary writs, such as the writ of habeas 
corpus.  For discussions of the common law extraordinary writs, see 2 CHESTER J. 
ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES (1987); FORREST G. FERRIS & 
FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (1926). 
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accountings, trusts, reformation of contracts, and some forms of 
restitution.26 
The second major limitation on English civil juries was that they 
could decide questions of fact, but not questions of law.  This 
limitation was apparently well-established by the seventeenth century, 
when Lord Coke said unequivocally that judges are to decide 
questions of law, and juries are to decide questions of fact.27  There 
were problems with this neat maxim, however.  First, some forms of 
pleading allowed juries to make de facto determinations of law.  For 
example, while English common law pleading rules historically 
required the parties to continue pleading until they had reduced the 
matter to a single issue of fact or law,28 the general issue plea allowed 
a party to contest the entire opposing pleading without specifying the 
part of the pleading with which she took issue.29  This sometimes 
meant that a jury could not help but make a determination of law. 
Second, it was not always easy to distinguish fact from law.30  This 
difficulty manifested itself in several ways.  Judges and juries often 
seemed to share decision-making on some issues, with juries deciding 
what the facts were and judges then applying the law to those facts.31  
For example, in a common law libel action, the jury would decide 
whether the alleged libel had been published and the import of the 
words used, but the judge would make a determination of law as to 
whether the jury’s fact-finding warranted a judgment of libel.32  
Disputes sometimes arose between judge and jury when the jury’s 
fact-finding conflicted with the judge’s views, but English judges 
could guide the jury by instructing it as to the law and by 
 
 26 Pomeroy’s treatise is five volumes, which attests to the scope and complexity 
that equity eventually acquired.  See supra note 22. 
 27 See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 135 n.7; see also THAYER, supra note 3, at 
185, 187.  See generally BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: ENGLAND 1550-1720 
(2000) (describing how the concept of “fact” arose out of developments in English 
law); Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, 
18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267 (1974) (discussing the role of the special verdict in the 
development of the law/fact distinction); S.F.C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal 
Development, 17 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1967) (describing the effect of distinguishing 
between law and fact on the development of legal principles). 
 28 See THAYER, supra note 3; MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF 
TRESPASS FROM THE KING’S COURTS, 1307-99, at x-xx (Selden Society vol. 100, 1985). 
 29 See J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 84 (3d ed. 1990); see 
also David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 
669 (1989). 
 30 See supra note 3. 
 31 See, e.g., Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 205-06, 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 508-09 (N.P. 
1793); FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 221, 223-35; THAYER, supra note 3, at 185-88. 
 32 See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 223-35. 
 2003 THE ALCHEMY OF FACT AND LAW 579 
commenting on the evidence.33  Although juries could defy the 
judge’s guidance and find the facts differently from the judge’s 
suggestions, the trial judge had the power to order a new trial if he 
thought the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.34  A 
further complication is that juries were usually asked to apply the law 
to the facts even though that was not their job.35  A party could 
remove the law-applying task from the jury through procedural 
devices such as the demurrer to the evidence.36 
Another manifestation of the difficulty in classifying issues as fact 
or law is reflected in some rather arbitrary historical characterizations 
of adjudicatory tasks.37  For example, the interpretation of written 
documents was characterized as a question of law for the judge, 
apparently on the theory that the words on a page have immutable 
legal meaning.38  In modern practice, we look to the intent of the 
parties behind the writing’s language and consider intent a question 
 
 33 See id. at 224-25. 
 34 See id. at 157-58.  Many English common law trials were actually held before 
more than one judge.  See DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND, 1727-
1875, at 7-8, 23 (1982); see also S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 72 (2d ed. 1981); Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 508; Steel v. Houghton, 1 H. 
Bl. 52, 52-63, 126 Eng. Rep. 32, 33-39 (C.P. 1788); Harris v. Porter, Car. 1, 1-2, 124 
Eng. Rep. 788, 788-89 (C.P. 1688).  For discussion of how English courts were 
organized, see RONALD WALKER & RICHARD WARD, WALKER & WALKER’S ENGLISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM 131-39 (7th ed. 1994).  While the trial court could order a new trial for 
alleged factual error, the appellate courts had no such power.  See ROSCOE POUND, 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 57 (1941).  Appellate courts could order a new 
trial only for legal error.  See id.  There was no provision for either trial or appellate 
courts to enter judgments contrary to the jury’s fact-finding.  There is some authority 
stating that appellate courts could “recall” judgments for factual errors, but such 
factual errors are narrowly defined and must appear on the face of the record.  See id.  
Factual errors subject to this procedure include such matters as the plaintiff’s being 
underage, the plaintiff’s being a married woman, or the death of the plaintiff prior 
to the verdict.  See 2 MATTHEW BACON, NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 217 (1736).  
Appellate courts could not recall verdicts that the jury returned on disputed 
questions of fact.  See id. 
 35 See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 509.  See generally Green, supra note 3 (describing 
the difficulty of separating questions of law from questions of fact). 
 36 See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 509; see also Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. 
Co., 142 U.S. 128, 134 (1891) (discussing English practice); Hopkins v. Nashville, C 
& St. L. Ry., 34 S.W. 1029 (Tenn. 1896) (same).  A demurrer to the evidence is 
similar to the modern directed verdict. 
 37 There are many examples of apparently arbitrary classifications of issues of fact 
or law.  See Isaacs, supra note 3, at 4-5.  Isaacs was looking primarily at American cases 
around the turn of the twentieth century.  See id. 
 38 See, e.g., Macbeath v. Haldimand, 1 T.R. 173, 180-82, 99 Eng. Rep. 1036, 1040-
41 (K.B. 1786); Clench v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (1603); Vicary v. 
Farthing, Cro. Eliz. 411, 78 Eng. Rep. 653 (1595); THAYER, supra note 3, at 205-06.  
One reason for this rule is that many jurors could not read.  See Macferson v. Thoytes, 
Peake 29, 170 Eng. Rep. 67 (N.P. 1790). 
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of fact, perhaps reflecting less confidence in the determinacy of 
words.39  Mixed questions of law and fact also made the law/fact 
distinction difficult because there were only two ways to allocate 
authority: to the judge or to the jury.40  Mixed questions often appear 
to be questions of fact, but have some legal content.  For example, 
the question whether an alleged tortfeasor’s conduct was reasonable 
under the circumstances is generally considered to be a question of 
fact for the jury.41  The decision, however, can help define the 
contours of reasonableness, and thus provide guidance to others.  
This gives the determination the look of law.42 
At common law there were a number of procedural devices used 
to police the judge/jury allocation and these devices are important 
for the analysis that follows.43  The two most important are demurrer 
to the evidence and case reserved.  Demurrer to the evidence allowed 
a party to obtain a decision on the law of the case by admitting the 
facts and inferences shown by her opponent’s evidence.44  It required 
the party to forego presenting any evidence of her own, so that if she 
lost the demurrer to the evidence, she lost the case.45  Case reserved 
allowed the court to give the case to the jury while reserving a 
decision on a question of law that arose during the trial.  It was 
possible for the court to decide the question of law in a way that 
conflicted with the jury’s decision, but the legal decision prevailed.46  
 
 39 See, e.g., Rankin v. Fid. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 189 U.S. 242, 252-54 (1903); 
Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966); 5 MARGARET N. 
KNIFFEN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.30 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998).  On 
the indeterminacy of words, see generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1958); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL 
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 238-39 (1995); Peter C. 
Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory 
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2514-18 (1992). 
 40 See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 8-10; see also Bohlen, supra note 3; Green, supra 
note 3. 
 41 See, e.g., Lewis v. Knowlton, 688 A.2d 912, 914 (Me. 1997); Johnson v. A.M.C., 
225 N.W.2d 57, 65 (N.D. 1974); J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Brockman, 135 S.W.2d 698, 
699 (Tex. 1940); Bohlen, supra note 3, at 115. 
 42 See generally Bohlen, supra note 3 (discussing mixed questions of law and fact); 
Green, supra note 3 (same). 
 43 For discussions of these various devices, see Edith Guild Henderson, The 
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); ROBERT WYNESS 
MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 297-309 
(1952). 
 44 See Henderson, supra note 43, at 304-05; see also Galloway v. United States, 319 
U.S. 372, 399-400 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 45 For discussions of the demurrer to the evidence, see THAYER, supra note 3, at 
234-39; Henderson, supra note 43, at 304-05. 
 46 For discussions of the case reserved, see Henderson, supra note 43, at 305-07. 
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Other devices, bearing modern names but differing substantially 
from the modern form, were directed verdict and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.47  The directed verdict was simply an 
instruction to the jury, which the jury could ignore.  The judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict was a device used by the plaintiff to 
challenge the sufficiency of the defendant’s pleading after the 
verdict.48 
By 1791, when the Seventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was ratified, the rules governing the allocation of 
decision-making authority between judges and juries in England had 
grown quite complex.  On the surface, two primary allocational rules 
were still in place—juries functioned only in common law courts and 
they decided only questions of fact, while judges decided everything 
else.  The difficulty of fitting complicated, multi-faceted questions 
into just two categories, fact and law, gave rise to some strange and 
over-lapping rules.  We still struggle with this problem of allocation 
today, and English history continues to inform the resolution of this 
problem. 
2.  American Origins 
The American colonies adapted many English practices when 
they set up their governments, including the practice of using juries 
in both civil and criminal cases.  This does not mean that jury 
practice in the various colonies was identical to that of England; nor 
does it mean that such practice was uniform among the colonies.  
There were many variations in jury practice, both large and small.49  
One important difference between English and colonial juries was 
that, in many of the colonies, juries had the power to decide law as 
well as fact.50  On the other hand, the colonies generally maintained 
the distinction between law and equity, though many maintained the 
 
 47 See Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 
44 MINN. L. REV. 903, 910 (1971); see also Henderson, supra note 43, at 302-04. 
 48 See MILLAR, supra note 43, at 324.  The judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
was the reverse of the motion in arrest of judgment, whereby the defendant could 
challenge a pleading error by the plaintiff after the verdict.  See id.; see also HERBERT 
BROOM, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW 208 (4th ed. 1873). 
 49 See generally Henderson, supra note 43, at 289 (discussing a variation in jury 
practice). 
 50 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 3-29 
(1975); Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); see also Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional 
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 705-06 n.183 (1973); Stephen 
C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 103-06; 
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 172 
(1964). 
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distinction through separate procedures rather than separate courts.51  
In addition, limitations on appellate review of jury verdicts were at 
least as strong in the colonies as in England.52 
Colonial practices reflect the fact that the jury was one of the 
most important institutions in the struggle for independence.53  
Colonial juries regularly refused to enforce British laws that the 
colonists viewed as oppressive, whether the laws were civil or 
criminal.54  Indeed, the British tried vigorously to evade colonial 
juries by providing that sensitive matters be tried in courts of equity 
or admiralty, where the jury did not operate.55  Depriving the 
colonists of trial by jury was one of the grievances set forth against the 
king in the Declaration of Independence.56 
Nevertheless, in 1787, when the Constitutional Convention 
proposed a new Constitution to the American people to replace the 
dysfunctional Articles of Confederation,57 the proposed Constitution 
contained no reference to civil juries, though it did provide for a 
right to jury trial in criminal cases.58  Furthermore, Article III of the 
Constitution provided that the Supreme Court had appellate 
jurisdiction “both as to Law and Fact,”59 a power that could effectively 
nullify a jury verdict.  Some people interpreted these provisions as 
meaning that the civil jury was abolished, and used that alleged 
 
 51 See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 8 n.14, 493 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971).  The 
colonies had trouble deciding how to incorporate equitable principles, and so took 
many approaches, including separate courts, separate procedures, and legislative 
determinations of claims in equity.  See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the 
United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
 52 See id. at 19-35. 
 53 See NELSON, supra note 50; Wolfram, supra note 50, at 653-56. 
 54 See, e.g., VINCENT BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (1957) (discussing 
criminal libel trial of newspaper editor); NELSON, supra note 50, at 31 (discussing 
nullification of the Navigation Act); Wolfram, supra note 50, at 703-08. 
 55 See GOEBEL, supra note 51, at 85-87. 
 56 See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 1 (American State Papers 1952) (1776). 
 57 For general histories of the Constitutional Convention and the origins of the 
Constitution, see THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, WHICH FRAME 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON, A 
DELEGATE FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 
1920); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1913); CLINTON LAWRENCE ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966). 
 58 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3 (providing for a right to jury trial in criminal 
cases). 
 59 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2 (describing the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court).  For a discussion of the powers of courts in England to alter jury verdicts, see 
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
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abolition to rouse opposition to the Constitution.60  When the 
Constitution was ratified in 1789, it was understood that the First 
Congress would propose a Bill of Rights in the form of amendments 
to the Constitution, and Congress wasted no time in doing so.61  The 
Seventh Amendment contains the guarantee of a right to a civil jury.62 
The Seventh Amendment was problematic for the drafters of the 
Bill of Rights because of the considerable variation in jury practices 
that existed among the states.  The Amendment’s language is 
intentionally vague, but it invokes both the law/equity distinction and 
the law/fact distinction.  It specifically refers to the common law (not 
equity) and to the jury’s fact-finding powers.63  It also invokes history 
in its provision that the right to jury trial is “preserved.”64  The 
Seventh Amendment does not, however, protect juries’ law-deciding 
authority; it only protects the jury’s fact-finding authority from review 
by the courts.  The next section briefly describes the interpretive 
problems that have faced the courts since the Seventh Amendment’s 
ratification in 1791. 
B.  Interpretation 
1.  Language 
The courts have faced a number of questions regarding the 
Seventh Amendment over the course of the country’s history.  What, 
for example, is meant by “suits at common law”?  Does the phrase 
encompass statutory actions?  Courts have also asked what is meant by 
 
 60 See Wolfram, supra note 50, at 657-61.  Proponents of the new Constitution 
defended the omission of a right to a civil jury, arguing, among other things, that the 
omission did not abolish the right to a civil jury, but only left it in the capable hands 
of Congress.  See THE FEDERALIST, No. 83 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) 
(1788).  This was too-small comfort for proponents of the civil jury. 
 61 Bill of Rights, 1 Stat. 97 (1789). 
 62 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 63 The federal courts that were established under the Judiciary Act of 1789 were 
unitary—they they handled both legal and equitable matters, though they used 
different procedures for the two kinds of matters.  See SWARD, supra note 2, at 103.  
Until promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, federal courts 
were required to use the procedures of the state in which they were sitting in all 
common law matters.  See Practice Conformity Act, ch. 225, 17 Stat. 197 (1872).  See 
generally ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 428-29 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing 
the Conformity Act).  The practice originated with the First Congress.  See Process 
Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789).  When federal courts heard equitable 
matters, they followed the Federal Equity Rules, first promulgated in 1822.  See Rules 
of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822); 
see also Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) (granting the Supreme 
Court authority to promulgate rules for equity practice). 
 64 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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“preserving” the right to jury trial.  Are we bound strictly to the 
historical right, or can changes in the common law result in changes 
in the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial?65  What exactly is the 
nature of the right that is preserved?  Does the reference to the fact-
finding authority of the jury in the Amendment’s second clause help 
define that fundamental right? 
In approaching these questions it is helpful to break the 
Amendment into its constituent parts—something that the courts 
have done implicitly almost since the Amendment’s adoption.  The 
most reasonable parsing of the Amendment, and the one most 
consistent with judicial practice, is as follows: 
[A] In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, [1] the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and [2] no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.66 
This gives the Amendment an introductory clause that limits the right 
defined in the Amendment to “Suits at common law.”  It then 
continues with two separate clauses.  The first “preserve[s]” the right 
to jury trial, and I shall refer to it as the Preservation Clause.  The 
second, commonly referred to as the Re-Examination Clause, bars 
courts from re-examining jury verdicts except in accordance with 
common law rules.  The Amendment as a whole is a response to the 
complaints raised during the ratification debates that the 
Constitution lacked protection for the civil jury.67  The Re-
Examination Clause responds to the specific fear that the Supreme 
Court’s appellate power “both as to Law and Fact” would negate any 
jury right that the Amendment otherwise provided.68 
One of the earliest expositors of the Seventh Amendment was 
Justice Story.  To this day courts frequently cite to his opinion in the 
1830 case Parsons v. Bedford.69  In Parsons, Justice Story noted that the 
Seventh Amendment “requires that the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved in suits at common law.”70  However, he also stated 
 
 65 For discussions of static versus dynamic interpretations of the Seventh 
Amendment, see Wolfram, supra note 50, at 731-47; Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort 
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 504-17 
(1998). 
 66 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 67 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 68 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
 69 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830). 
 70 See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446-47.  Justice Story’s statement is a juxtaposition of 
phrases.  In the Seventh Amendment, the language “in Suits at common law” comes 
before the language saying that the right to trial by jury is to be preserved.  See U.S. 
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unequivocally that the Re-Examination Clause, which was at issue in 
Parsons, was the more important clause of the Seventh Amendment.71  
He described it as “a substantial and independent clause.”72  
Nevertheless, the decision in Parsons turned more on the law/equity 
distinction than on the precise meaning of the Re-Examination 
Clause and the case is cited most often for its interpretation of the 
phrase “Suits at common law.”73 
The question in Parsons was whether the trial court had erred in 
refusing to allow evidence to be recorded at the trial as permitted 
under Louisiana procedural rules, which were applicable in the 
federal courts under the Conformity Act.74  The only purpose for such 
recording was to allow the appellate court to review the jury’s fact-
finding.75  The argument in favor of recording was that the matter was 
not a common law matter because it was a diversity case that arose in 
Louisiana, which used a variant of civil law, not common law.76  The 
Court rejected this argument, holding that the phrase “common law” 
in the Seventh Amendment was meant to distinguish equity, 
admiralty, and maritime law.77  In other words, anything that was not 
equity, admiralty, or maritime law was common law within the 
meaning of the Seventh Amendment.  The Court said, 
By common law, [the framers] meant what the constitution 
denominated in the third article “law;” not merely suits, which the 
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but 
suits in which legal rights were asserted to be ascertained and 
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights 
alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were 
administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of public 
law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same 
 
CONST. amend. VII. 
 71 See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447. 
 72 Id.  Indeed, in United States v. Wonson, Justice Story misquoted the Amendment, 
putting a period after “preserved” and capitalizing “and,” thus emphasizing the 
independence of the clauses.  28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).  
Justice Story also misquoted the Amendment in Parsons v. Bedford, quoting the Re-
Examination Clause as stating that “no fact once tried by jury shall be otherwise re-
examinable in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”  28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (emphasis added). 
 73 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. 526 U.S. 687, 
726 n.1 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 
523 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1998). 
 74 See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 435-36.  For a discussion of the Conformity Act, see supra 
note 63. 
 75 See Parsons, 28 U.S. at 435-36. 
 76 See id. at 436. 
 77 See id. at 446. 
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suit.78 
The matter at issue in Parsons did not involve equity, admiralty, or 
maritime law, and it therefore fell within the Seventh Amendment’s 
definition of “common law.”  As the Seventh Amendment permitted 
no appellate review of the jury’s fact-finding in “[s]uits at common 
law,” the trial judge had not erred in refusing to permit recording of 
the evidence.79 
An equally important statement of the Seventh Amendment’s 
meaning came from Justice Story while he was sitting as a circuit 
justice.80  In Wonson v. United States,81 the losing party in a federal 
district court sought to have his case retried in a circuit court by 
another jury.82  The matter was partly one of statutory construction, as 
Congress had enacted a series of somewhat confusing and 
inconsistent statutes governing the appellate jurisdiction of various 
courts.83  Consistent with now-familiar rules of construction, Justice 
Story interpreted the statutes to make them consistent with the 
Constitution.  Citing the common law of England, the Justice noted 
that facts found by a jury could never be re-examined at common law 
“unless a new trial is granted in the discretion of the court, before 
which the suit is depending, for good cause shown; or unless the 
judgment of such court is reversed by a superior tribunal, on a writ of 
error, and a venire facias de novo is awarded.”84  He noted further 
that a writ of error allows examination of “general errors of law only,” 
and the appeals court “never can re-try the issues already settled by a 
jury, where the judgment of the inferior court is affirmed.”85  In other 
words, trial judges could order a new trial for good cause, but 
 
 78 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 79 Id. at 455. 
 80 The first judiciary act set up two kinds of lower federal courts, denominated 
district courts and circuit courts.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  The two 
kinds of courts, however, bore little resemblance to the modern courts bearing those 
names.  Both courts could hold trials, though their jurisdiction was somewhat 
different.  Circuit courts, however, could also function as courts of appeals from 
district court decisions.  For appellate matters, circuit courts were staffed by two 
justices of the Supreme Court sitting as circuit justices, and by a judge from the 
district court, probably the same judge who had decided the case initially.  For 
discussions of this early history, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28-31 (4th ed. 1996); 
ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1987). 
 81 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). 
 82 Id. at 750. 
 83 Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745-47. 
 84 Id. at 750. 
 85 Id. 
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appellate courts could only deal with alleged errors of law.86  This is 
the virtually contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the 
Re-Examination Clause. 
While Justice Story’s exposition has served as the foundation on 
which Seventh Amendment analysis has been built, courts and 
commentators have paid much more attention to the Amendment’s 
first clause than the second clause.  Despite Justice Story’s insistence 
that the two clauses are independent, there appear to be substantial 
connections between them.  One is the common law.  The 
introductory clause of the Amendment ties the two together by 
limiting application of both clauses of the Amendment to “Suits at 
common law.”  Another linkage between the two clauses is also 
apparent.  The Preservation Clause preserves the right to jury trial, 
but does not define that right.87  The Re-Examination Clause helps to 
define the jury trial right, by protecting the jury’s fact-finding 
authority.  Indeed, defining the right to jury trial as the right to have 
the jury find facts constitutes one of the Supreme Court’s principle 
definitions of this preserved fundamental right.88 
Defining the right in this manner is consistent with English 
practice, where the law/fact distinction was the principle means of 
allocating decision-making authority between judge and jury.  Justice 
Story, in describing the Re-Examination Clause as the more 
important of the Seventh Amendment’s two clauses, recognized the 
significance of the jury’s fact-finding authority.  I have already 
demonstrated that the law/fact distinction is not an easy one to 
articulate or to use, but it is at least a start.  A brief look at how the 
Court has handled the law/equity and law/fact distinctions in 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence reveals that the Court has been 
much more protective of the law/equity distinction than of the 
law/fact distinction. 
 
 86 Trial courts could order a new trial if the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence.  See, e.g., Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (1757); Wood v. 
Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (1655).  Henderson, however, says that the 
practice was not firmly established until 1836.  See Henderson, supra note 43, at 311.  
This is another example of the difficulty of determining what the rules were in 
England in 1791. 
 87 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 88 See, e.g., Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 
(1931); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920); Walker v. N.W. & S. Pac. R.R. 
Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1897).  See also Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: 
The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
183, 200-07 (2000). 
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2.  Common Law and Equity 
In United States v. Wonson, Justice Story said that the Seventh 
Amendment’s reliance on the common law of England to define a 
suit at common law was “obvious to every person acquainted with the 
history of the law.”89  Justice Story thought it unnecessary to expound 
on the reasons for this reliance.90  But the distinction between law and 
equity was not as clear in the new federal courts, or in many of the 
states, as it was in England.  Congress created lower federal courts in 
1789, but it did not create separate courts of law and equity. 91  
Litigants, however, still filed cases in either law or equity.  Although 
different procedural rules applied to legal and equitable cases,92 the 
same judges heard both, sitting in either law or equity as each case 
demanded.  As long as this clear separation was maintained, there 
were few conflicts over the right to jury trial in the federal courts.  
Those that did arise, as in Wonson and Parsons, tended to concern not 
the initial assignment of the matter to law or equity, but questions 
about the courts’ power to review jury verdicts. 
The matter became more complicated as law and equity merged 
beginning with the state courts in the mid-nineteenth century.  The 
Conformity Act required that federal courts follow state procedures 
in common law actions,93 but as states eliminated the distinction 
between law and equity, it became more difficult for federal judges to 
determine what procedures to apply—state procedures or federal 
equity rules.94  While it was implicit in Justice Story’s opinions in 
Wonson and Parsons, it was not until the 1935 cases of Dimick v. 
 
 89 Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750. 
 90 One commentator has suggested that the reliance on English common law was 
a twentieth century development, and that nineteenth century Supreme Court cases 
tended to look to both English and American precedent, especially when analyzing 
the Preservation Clause.  See Moses, supra note 88, at 187-92.  The reference to “Suits 
at common law” in the Seventh Amendment is logically read as referring to both 
clauses, and it follows that the test for determining whether the matter is a suit at 
common law should be the same for both clauses. 
 91 See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 2-4 (1789). 
 92 See supra note 63. 
 93 See id.. 
 94 See, e.g., Gudger v. W. N.C.R. Co., 21 F. 81 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1884) (refusing to 
allow a single cause of action blending legal and equitable claims despite a state code 
that merged law and equity); Montejo v. Owen, 17 F. Cas. 610 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) 
(No. 9,722) (applying federal equity rules to an equitable defense despite the New 
York state rule that merged law and equity and allowed an equitable defense to be 
asserted to a common law claim); Beardsley v. Littell, 2 F. Cas. 1178 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1877) (No. 1,185) (refusing to allow pre-trial examination of witnesses in a legal 
action despite a state code that merged law and equity and would have allowed it). 
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Scheidt95 and Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman96 that the Court 
stated explicitly that courts should look to the English common law in 
1791—the year of the Amendment’s ratification—to define the 
distinction between law and equity. 
Three years later, in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
took effect, merging law and equity under a single set of procedures 
in the federal courts.97  Although the issue then became more acute 
for the courts, the Supreme Court’s first significant statement about 
the effect of the merger on the definition of law and equity did not 
come until 1959.  In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,98 the Court held 
that when legal and equitable matters are presented in the same case, 
there is a right to trial by jury as to all facts that are common to the 
legal and equitable issues, as well as facts that are particular to the 
legal issues.99  This outcome resulted from changes in procedural 
rules, which eliminated the grounds for equitable action in many 
cases.100  Thus, procedural changes could result in apparent 
expansion of the right to jury trial. 
In 1974, the Court started down a path that brought history even 
more squarely into the Seventh Amendment analysis of the 
distinction between law and equity.  In Curtis v. Loether,101 the Court 
held that the Seventh Amendment applies to “actions enforcing 
statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute 
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for 
damages in the ordinary courts of law.”102  While this is certainly 
reminiscent of Parsons v. Bedford, which held that the statute-based 
civil law of Louisiana was “common law” for purposes of the Seventh 
Amendment,103 Curtis opened the door to an explicit historical test to 
distinguish law and equity.  The test, which was implicit in Curtis but 
 
 95 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
 96 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
 97 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2nd §§ 1041-45 (1987). 
 98 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 99 See id. at 510-11.  For a more detailed discussion of Beacon Theatres, see SWARD, 
supra note 2, at 162-65. 
 100 See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-10; see also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 
U.S. 469 (1962) (holding that a jury trial was required in an action seeking injunctive 
relief and equitable accounting because the underlying relief requested was legal 
and the Federal Rules’ provision for masters eliminates the need for equity to act); 
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (holding that a jury was required for a 
shareholders’ derivative suit because the underlying claim was legal).  For a more 
detailed discussion of these cases, see SWARD, supra note 2, at 166-68. 
 101 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
 102 Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
 103 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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became explicit thirteen years later in Tull v. United States,104 has two 
steps: first, the Court must find an English claim that existed at the 
time of the Seventh Amendment’s ratification and is analogous to the 
statutory claim at issue; second, the Court must examine the remedy 
to determine if it is legal or equitable.105  The Court has continued to 
apply this test despite some misgivings among various justices.106  
Indeed, the Court applies this test not only to statutory actions, but to 
common law actions as well, though common law actions are often 
easier to characterize.107 
In short, history is at least nominally quite important in the 
Seventh Amendment analysis of the distinction between law and 
equity.  A purely historical analysis, however, would hold that the 
right to jury trial prevails only in those precise cases where a jury 
would have been available in 1791 England.108  The current test 
 
 104 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987). 
 105 See id. 
 106 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).  
Terry generated spirited disagreement about whether this historical approach is 
appropriate.  See id. at 574-81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the first step 
should be eliminated and courts should rely solely on the historical remedy); see also 
id. at 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that precise analogies are 
unnecessary, but that the Court should decide based on whether the matter is similar 
to one that common law courts would have handled in England in 1791); id. at 584-
95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first step should determine the 
matter).  All of these opinions, however, look to history to some degree.  The Court 
still refers to the two-part test in determining whether the matter is legal or 
equitable.  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 107 See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42-49 (1989) (applying 
the test to common law fraudulent conveyance actions in bankruptcy court).  The 
test will be easy to apply if the cause of action existed in England in 1791, but there 
are circumstances where the analysis could be complicated even for common law 
actions.  The first circumstance is when an action did not exist at common law, but 
has evolved in the United States since 1791.  An example is dram shop liability, which 
holds a barkeeper liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated person who drank at 
his bar.  Compare Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (Ill. 1889) (saying that it was not a tort 
at common law to supply alcoholic beverages to a “strong and able-bodied man”), 
with Schelin v. Goldberg, 146 A.2d 648, 652-53 (Pa. 1958) (recognizing liability of bar 
owner for injuries to patron when bar owner served patron knowing that he was 
already intoxicated).  For a history of social host and dramshop liability, see Robert 
G. Franks, Note, Common Law Liability of Liquor Vendors, 31 MONT. L. REV. 241, 242-48 
(1970).  Another circumstance is where the action existed in England in 1791, but 
there was a choice of remedy.  An example is breach of contract, which in 1791 
England, could be heard in a court of law if money damages were sought, or in a 
court of equity if various equitable remedies, such as rescission, reformation, or 
specific performance, were sought.  In the latter instance, the nature of the remedy, 
the second step in the two-step analysis, would be the determining factor. 
 108 Some commentators have suggested such an analysis.  See, e.g., Martin H. 
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational 
Decisionmaking, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975). 
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requires jury trials in some actions that would have been equitable in 
eighteenth century England, and it requires jury trials in some 
actions that did not exist in eighteenth century England.109  History, 
therefore, comes into play in analogizing modern actions to actions 
that existed in England in 1791. 
3.  Law and Fact 
In Beacon Theatres, the Court allowed a procedural change, the 
merger of law and equity, to affect the right to a jury trial.  The 
change resulted in more cases being tried to a jury than would have 
been tried to a jury in England in 1791.  By contrast, a number of 
other procedural changes have affected analysis of the law/fact 
distinction, and the Court has been less protective of the jury in the 
face of those changes.  The Court has repeatedly made it clear that 
courts are not tied to the precise procedures available in 1791 English 
courts, and therefore, that procedural changes can affect the jury’s 
domain as long as they do not undercut the “fundamental” right to a 
jury trial.110  The Court has not clearly defined the “fundamental” 
right, but has suggested that the jury’s fact-finding role is 
fundamental.111 
Indeed, some recent cases have suggested that the Court is 
growing more concerned about protecting the jury’s fact-finding 
authority.  For example, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc.,112 the Court overturned a judgment as a matter of law on the 
grounds that the lower court, in granting the judgment, had ignored 
evidence in favor of the non-moving party and had failed to draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.113  In fact, 
there is some evidence that the Supreme Court is somewhat more 
protective than lower courts of the jury’s fact-finding role.114  But if 
the Supreme Court is concerned about preserving the jury’s fact-
finding role, it might have to reconsider 130 years of history.  Over 
the course of that history questions of fact have been transformed 
 
 109 My own view is that the right to jury trial is sufficiently important that this 
expansion is quite proper.  See generally SWARD, supra note 2, at ch. 2 (describing the 
value of the civil jury). 
 110 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-92 (1943). 
 111 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 88. 
 112 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 113 See id. at 152-54. 
 114 See, e.g., Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV. 141, 205-18 (2000) (discussing recent Supreme Court cases on summary 
judgment); Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries – Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury 
Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 298-313 (discussing lower court and Supreme Court 
rulings on judgment notwithstanding the verdict). 
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into questions of law, with the result that judges decide matters today 
that would have been decided by juries in England in 1791.  The next 
section details that development. 
III.  HOW FACT BECAME LAW: TRACING THE ORIGINS OF DIRECTED 
VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The transformation of fact into law is best demonstrated by 
starting with the most significant case in this development and 
tracing the doctrine back through the cases it cites.  This analysis 
starts with an important doctrinal change that preceded all 
procedural developments: the adoption of the “reasonable jury” test.  
It then examines the directed verdict and Galloway v. United States,115 
which held that the directed verdict procedure did not violate the 
Seventh Amendment.  It then examines judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, focusing on the most significant case, Baltimore & Carolina 
Line, Inc. v. Redman.116  Finally, the inquiry shifts to an evaluation of 
summary judgment.  This is a more difficult analysis because the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly considered whether the current 
summary judgment procedure is constitutional.  An early Supreme 
Court opinion and several lower court decisions shed light on the 
constitutionality of summary judgement, however, and serve as a 
starting point.  Three 1986 cases, widely thought to have changed 
summary judgment practice, are also relevant. Finally, this section 
traces the transformation of fact into law and thereby illustrates this 
article’s thesis: judges now decide matters that would have been 
decided by juries at common law. 
A.  The Unifying Test: The Reasonable Jury 
The most significant shift in the law relating to the law-fact 
distinction was the recognition of the “reasonable jury” standard.  
Under this standard a judge can take a case from the jury by a variety 
of devices if there is no substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could reach a verdict in favor of one party; in other words, if 
there is only one reasonable outcome.117  The key word is 
“reasonable” because the cases suggest that what is “reasonable” is 
often in the eyes of the beholder.  Indeed, many of the cases 
 
 115 319 U.S. 372 (1943). 
 116 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
 117 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  The test is often referred 
to as the “substantial evidence” test.  See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 
564-66 (3d ed. 1999). 
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discussed in this section demonstrate that reasonable people can 
disagree about what is reasonable.  This section explores the origins 
of the shift to the reasonable jury standard.118 
The shift began in the United States with the Supreme Court’s 
1871 decision in Improvement Company v. Munson.119  It appears from 
the complicated facts that the plaintiffs and defendants had 
conflicting claims for land in Pennsylvania.120  Surveys taken at the 
times of the initial land grants put the respective parcels some miles 
apart from one another.121  A later survey produced the conflict.122  
The lower court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiffs on the 
ground that there was no evidence of authorization for the later 
survey and subsequent surveys done without authorization were 
invalid.123  That being the case, the court held that there was no 
conflict in the ownership.124 
The Supreme Court affirmed, applying the settled rule that a 
case should not be submitted to the jury where there is no evidence 
on the subject, but the court thought it was adopting a new rule for 
determining whether there was any evidence in the record.125  The 
Court said: 
Formerly it was held that if there was what is called a scintilla of 
evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to 
the jury, but recent decisions of high authority have established a 
more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is 
left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not 
whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any 
upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the 
party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.126 
The Court then found that the defendants were asking, in effect, that 
the court apply a presumption: that the presence of a second survey is 
 
 118 It is reasonable to ask, if we are examining a shift, what came before the 
“reasonable jury” standard.  The answer is not entirely clear, though the former test 
has often been referred to as the “scintilla” test—as long as there was a scintilla of 
evidence for the non-moving party, the case had to go to the jury.  See, e.g., 
Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1871).  It is clear, however, 
that the reasonable jury standard made it easier to take cases away from the jury. 
 119 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442 (1871). 
 120 Id. at 442-46. 
 121 Id. at 444-45. 
 122 See generally id. at 443-46. 
 123 See id. at 446. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Munson, 81 U.S. at 448. 
 126 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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presumptive evidence of that survey’s proper authorization.127  The 
Court refused to apply this presumption, and thus, the absence of any 
evidence establishing authorization was determinative.128  In other 
words, the Court in Munson refused to allow the jury to infer 
authorization from the existence of the second survey because such 
an inference would undermine its ruling on an evidentiary 
presumption.  A decision not to employ a presumption is more a 
question of law than of fact.129  Under this reading, Munson has come 
to stand for more than its facts would seem to warrant because there 
was, literally, no evidence of a critical fact: authorization for the 
second survey. 
The “recent decisions of high authority” 130 that the Court 
referred to were mostly English cases.  The earliest of these was Jewell 
v. Parr,131 decided in 1853, and it is apparently the first case to hold 
that a court can take a case from the jury even when there is some 
evidence on both sides.132  Jewell was a suit by an indorsee on a bill of 
exchange against an acceptor for recovery of the value of the bill.133  
The acceptor claimed that he had accepted the bill without 
consideration solely to accommodate the drawer, and that the drawer 
had paid the bill when it became due.134  Apparently, however, the 
drawer had thereafter used the fully-paid bill as payment for another 
debt, and the creditor presented it to the acceptor for payment.135  
There was no direct evidence as to payment by the drawer, who was 
dead, but there were some indeterminate notations on the bill, 
including a due date that was earlier than the creditor’s acquisition of 
the bill.136  The only clear evidence of payment was the acceptor’s 
testimony.137  The jury returned a verdict for the acceptor, and the 
indorsee was given leave to move for judgment.138 
The court then ordered judgment for the indorsee on the 
ground that there was no evidence to show that the bill had been 
 
 127 See id. at 451. 
 128 Id. at 451-52. 
 129 See THAYER, supra note 3, at 212-13. 
 130 Munson, 81 U.S. at 448. 
 131 13. C.B. 909, 138 Eng. Rep. 1460 (1853). 
 132 Jewell, 138 Eng. Rep. at 1464-65. 
 133 Id. at 1460-61. 
 134 Id. at 1461. 
 135 See id. The plaintiff was the indorsee of the person who had obtained the 
allegedly fully paid bill.  Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1460-61. 
 138 Jewell, 138 Eng. Rep. at 1461. 
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paid and re-issued, as the acceptor claimed.139  Justice Maule said, 
Perhaps it cannot with strict propriety be said . . . that there is no 
evidence to go to the jury. . . .  [W]hen we say that there is no 
evidence to go to a jury, we do not mean that there is literally 
none, but that there is none which ought reasonably to satisfy a 
jury that the fact sought to be proved is established.140 
The issue was not strictly factual, however: there was a hint of a legal 
issue in the case as well.  The chief justice noted that the acceptor, 
not the drawer, is the person primarily responsible for paying the bill.  
If the drawer had in fact paid it, the acceptor’s recourse was against 
the drawer.141  Thus, if the court had allowed the jury’s verdict to 
stand, the rule that the acceptor was chiefly responsible for paying 
the bill would have been undermined, as any acceptor could claim 
payment by the drawer and put the credibility issue to the jury.  The 
issue in Jewell can be characterized, therefore, as a mixed question of 
law and fact. 
This case does indicate a shift in English practice toward 
awarding judgments inconsistent with the jury’s verdict when there is 
evidence going both ways, but there are factors that should have 
limited its reach in American jurisprudence.  First, as noted, the 
decision was necessary in order to preserve a rule of law concerning 
who had primary responsibility for paying a bill.  Second, the case, 
decided in 1853, is not part of the background of the Seventh 
Amendment, which was adopted in 1791.  Furthermore, the fact that 
Jewell cited no authority for the proposition that a court could take a 
case from the jury if there was no evidence upon which a reasonable 
jury could find for one of the parties suggests that this notion 
originated with the Jewell court, more than 60 years after the Seventh 
Amendment’s ratification. 
Munson next cited Ryder v. Wombwell,142 decided in 1868.  There, 
the question was whether a minor could be held to his debt on the 
ground that the debt was for “necessaries,” goods that were necessary 
 
 139 Id. at 1463-65. 
 140 Id. at 1463.  Indeed the court suggested that the evidence on that question 
allowed no firm conclusion for either party, which meant that the party with the 
burden of proof—the defendant on his defense of payment—could not prevail.  See 
id.  The defense of payment would now be deemed an affirmative defense in federal 
practice.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  In common law parlance, it was called an 
avoidance.  The court in Jewell did not use the term “avoidance,” but it is clear that 
the court viewed the matter as imposing a burden of proof on the defendant, which 
could only be the case if the defense were an avoidance. 
 141 See id. at 1463. 
 142 L.R., 4 Ex. 32 (1868). 
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to his station in life.143  The minor, a younger son of a deceased 
baronet, had purchased an antique silver goblet and a pair of jeweled 
solitaires.144  The jury found that the goods were necessaries, but the 
court believed that there was no evidence that the goods were 
necessary to the defendant’s station in life.145  The court applied the 
reasonable jury test announced in Jewell v. Parr,146 but it avoided 
deciding the question of fact by holding, in accordance with cited 
authority, that the goods were not prima facie necessary,147 and that it 
was incumbent upon the plaintiff to offer evidence that they were 
necessary.148  The court ordered a nonsuit149 because the plaintiff did 
not provide such evidence.150  Again, there are significant differences 
between this case and modern American practice.  First, a nonsuit is 
not the same as entering a judgment for the defendant.  A nonsuit 
gives the plaintiff the opportunity to try again with better evidence.  
Second, Ryder is really a decision that the plaintiff simply lacked 
necessary evidence under the substantive rule that the court was to 
apply.  It did not involve weighing evidence, though it would have if 
the plaintiff and defendant had each presented evidence on whether 
the goods were necessaries.  Thus, there was literally no evidence to 
support the plaintiff’s claim. 
The Court in Munson also cited two other English cases and one 
earlier decision of its own.  The two English cases had been cited in 
Ryder, and both were decided in 1857—four years after Jewell.  The 
first of these was Toomey v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway 
Co.151  The plaintiff in Toomey was an illiterate man who asked a fellow 
passenger for directions to the rest room at the railroad station.152  
When he followed those directions, he found two doors and 
mistakenly chose the one leading to a basement.153  He fell down the 
stairs and was injured.154  The court, affirming that more than a 
scintilla was required to send the case to the jury, found for the 
 
 143 See id. at 38. 
 144 See id. at 33. 
 145 See id. at 37. 
 146 See id. at 39. 
 147 See id. at 40-41. 
 148 Id. 
 149 A nonsuit allowed the court to dismiss the case without prejudice to the 
plaintiff.  It was generally done when the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence on 
an essential element, and it allowed the plaintiff to start over. 
 150 See id. at 42. 
 151 3 C.B. (N.S.) 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (1857). 
 152 Id. at 694-95. 
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defendant railroad on the question whether the railroad company 
was negligent.155  The court seemed to blame the plaintiff for his own 
carelessness, but also noted that the stairs presented no more than 
the normal danger.156  It suggested that if there had been evidence 
that the stairs were more than ordinarily dangerous, the plaintiff 
might have been successful.157  A nonsuit against the plaintiff was, 
therefore, affirmed.158 
In the second case cited by the Munson Court, Wheelton v. 
Hardisty,159 the plaintiffs were beneficiaries under a life insurance 
policy.160  The plaintiffs had loaned the insured a large sum of money 
with the insured’s reversionary interest in his father’s estate as 
security.161  If the insured did not survive his father, however, the 
security would be worthless; hence, the need for the life insurance.162  
Upon the death of the insured, the insurance company refused to 
pay on the ground that the insured had given false statements about 
his health.163  The false statements were given to the plaintiffs, 
however, and not to the insurance company.164  Believing the 
statements to be true, the plaintiffs had transmitted the allegedly false 
medical information to the insurance company in their application 
for insurance.165  The jury found no fraud on the part of the plaintiffs, 
and the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on three counts.166  
However, the court entered judgment for the defendants on a claim 
that plaintiffs had warranted the truth of the statements made in 
their application.167  The issues in the reported case were whether the 
insured’s fraud should be imputed to the plaintiffs and whether the 
record contained any evidence of warranty.168  The court held that the 
insured’s fraud should not be imputed to the plaintiffs, who were also 
 
 155 Id. at 695-96. 
 156 Id. at 696. 
 157 Toomey, 140 Eng. Rep. at 696. 
 158 See id. at 695, 696.  Recall that a nonsuit allowed the plaintiff to try again.  
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 159 8 El. & Bl. 232, 120 Eng. Rep. 86 (1857). 
 160 Id. at 86-87. 
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 162 See id. at 89. 
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 164 Id. at 92. 
 165 See Wheelton, 120 Eng. Rep. at 92. 
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victims of the insured’s false statements.169  But the court, 
emphasizing that the “scintilla” rule had been abandoned in favor of 
the reasonable jury standard,170 held that there was “no such proof in 
this case as would justify the jury in finding the issue [of warranty] for 
the plaintiffs.”171  The court found that the evidence was inconclusive 
as to whether the plaintiffs were induced to enter into the contract of 
insurance by a prospectus from the defendants in which the 
defendants said that their insurance would be unquestionable except 
in case of fraud.172  As the plaintiffs had the burden of proof on this 
issue, they could not prevail.173  The court also said, however, that it 
would be inclined to treat the insured’s fraud as negating the policy 
under the terms of the prospectus.174 
Both Toomey and Wheelton reaffirm the decision in Jewell to 
abandon the scintilla test in favor of a reasonable jury test.  In both 
cases, however, there was no disputed fact for the jury to decide.  In 
Toomey, there was no dispute about the circumstances under which 
the man fell down the stairs.  The only question regarded the fall’s 
legal significance.  Similarly, in Wheelton, everyone agreed that the 
plaintiffs were as unaware of the insured’s fraud as the defendants 
were.  The issue was the effect of that fraud on the insurance policy 
that the plaintiffs had purchased.175  Again, the question was more law 
than fact.  These cases can be read as applications of the English rule 
that juries decide disputed questions of fact, but judges decide the 
application of law to those facts.176 
The last case cited by Munson was a Supreme Court case, 
Schuchardt v. Allens.177  In Schuchardt the plaintiffs claimed breach of 
warranty in connection with their purchase of material used in 
dyeing.178  The plaintiffs had purchased the material based on a single 
bottle, despite the fact that they had not been permitted to open the 
bottle to inspect its contents.  The defendant asked the court to 
instruct the jury that there was no warranty, or that if there was, it was 
an implied warranty such that plaintiffs would have to establish 
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 170 See id. at 98. 
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fraud.179  The court refused, and the jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiffs.180  The Court found that the proposed instructions sought 
to take the case away from the jury181 and noted that instructions that 
seek to bind the jury’s fact-finding are proper because they are 
equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence.182  However, the Court 
found that the jury was justified in inferring a warranty.  In other 
words, the Court held that the lower court properly allowed the jury 
to decide whether the facts supported an inference of a warranty.183  
Thus, Munson cited Schuchardt primarily for its language suggesting 
that a case could be taken from the jury on a demurrer to the 
evidence. 
In short, neither Munson nor the cases it relies on support a 
radical transformation of the law/fact distinction whereby judges can 
take pure questions of fact away from the jury.  At best, these cases 
suggest that courts can take such matters from the jury when allowing 
the jury to decide the matter could undermine a rule of law.  They 
might also reinforce the English rule that judges decide the 
application of law to undisputed facts.  They might even be 
characterized as mixed questions of law and fact.  However, in no way 
can these cases be construed as allowing judges to take cases away 
from the jury when there are disputes of pure questions of fact, 
unmixed with law. 
B.  Directed Verdict: Galloway v. United States 
The first case to explicitly approve the directed verdict 
procedure provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was 
Galloway v. United States.184  In Galloway, the Court tied the directed 
verdict to the common law demurrer to the evidence, which gave it a 
grounding in common law procedure, but Galloway also held that 
courts were not bound to the precise contours of common law 
procedural devices.  Therefore, the fact that the directed verdict 
operated differently from the demurrer to the evidence did not 
render the directed verdict unconstitutional.185  This notion was not 
new; Galloway cited several earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases in 
support of the proposition that the Seventh Amendment did not 
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demand fidelity to common law procedures.186  Each of these cases, 
however, involved procedural changes that nevertheless left the fact-
finding in the jury’s hands.  One case allowed courts to order new 
trials limited to damages.187  Another approved the appointment of 
auditors to conduct accountings, with the final decision as to the 
accounting left with the jury.188  A third approved a procedure where 
a jury trial could be held before a justice of the peace, with an appeal 
permitted to the ordinary trial court, which would then conduct a 
second jury trial.189 
Galloway is inconsistent with the precedent it cited in two ways.  
First, unlike the cases discussed earlier, Galloway approved a 
procedure that took a disputed question of fact out of the hands of 
the jury.  In that sense, it went beyond being a mere procedural 
change.  Second, the kinds of questions that the old demurrer to the 
evidence took from the jury were really questions of law.  Galloway, by 
contrast, involved a disputed question of fact.190  In other words, while 
earlier cases distinguished fairly effectively between both substance 
and procedure and law and fact, Galloway muddied both distinctions.  
In the remainder of this section, I will concentrate on the law/fact 
distinction.  To see the difference between Galloway and the cases it 
relied on, I will present a detailed exposition of all of these cases.  I 
start with Galloway itself. 
Galloway concerned an insurance claim by an Army veteran, 
under a military insurance policy that paid benefits for permanent 
and total disability.191  The policy expired on May 31, 1919, so 
Galloway had to prove that he was permanently and totally disabled as 
of that date.192  This is quite clearly a question of fact, though it can be 
a complicated one.  The suit was brought in 1938, by which time 
everyone involved agreed that Galloway had been permanently and 
 
 186 See id.(citing Gasoline Prods. Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 
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totally disabled by reason of mental illness for at least six years.193  
Galloway’s evidence consisted of testimony from a boyhood friend 
who described Galloway’s mental condition before and after Galloway 
served in France during World War I; the testimony of two fellow 
soldiers from the war; the testimony of two superior officers from two 
tours of duty after the war; and the testimony of a chaplain who 
thought he had seen Galloway in a mental hospital in 1920.194  The 
trial court discounted the chaplain’s testimony, however, because it 
was inconsistent with records showing that Galloway was serving in 
the Navy at that time.195  The rest of the evidence tended to show 
mental instability during and after the war.  This evidence showed 
Galloway to be mentally unstable from about 1918 to the early- to 
mid-1920s, and possibly as late as 1925;196 however, there was no 
evidence for the period between 1925 and 1930.197  The most crucial 
evidence in favor of Galloway’s claim was the testimony of an expert 
witness, a medical doctor who examined Galloway shortly before the 
trial and testified that some people are born with an inherent 
instability that can be triggered by traumatic experiences, such as 
Galloway’s service in the war.198  The doctor expressed the opinion 
that Galloway had become insane during the war and had continued 
in that state ever since, though the nature of his illness meant that he 
could have periods of relative stability.199 
The trial court directed a verdict for the government, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.200  The Supreme Court by a vote of six to 
three agreed, holding that no reasonable jury could find for the 
plaintiff when there was so large and so unexplained a gap in the 
evidence.201  The Court found that the plaintiff should have been able 
to produce evidence as to his condition between 1925 and 1930, and 
his failure to do so could lead only to the conclusion that he was sane 
during those years.202  Galloway’s attorney had attempted to explain 
 
 193 A guardian was appointed in February 1932.  Id. at 374.  However, there was 
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the absence of evidence by noting that Galloway was a deserter from 
the Army and sought to avoid people he knew in order to escape 
detection and punishment.203  The Court rejected this explanation on 
the ground that, among other things, Galloway married during the 
period and his wife, who was his legal guardian, could have 
testified.204 
The Supreme Court also rejected Galloway’s argument that the 
directed verdict violated the Seventh Amendment, reasoning that the 
practice was too well-established in the United States to question it at 
that late date.205  The Court held that the Seventh Amendment did 
not bind courts to the exact procedural devices that existed in 
England in 1791, but allowed for some development in procedures 
while preserving “the basic institution of jury trial in only its most 
fundamental elements.”206  The Court emphasized that jury practice 
was evolving even when the Seventh Amendment was ratified, and 
was, therefore, not “crystallized in a fixed and immutable system.”207  
The Supreme Court finally held that changes in the standards of 
proof for submitting the case to the jury were irrelevant because no 
formulation of those standards allowed the jury to engage in 
speculation, which the record in Galloway would have required.208 
Three justices dissented, primarily on Seventh Amendment 
grounds, though they also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that no reasonable jury could find for Galloway.209  The dissenters 
thought that the demurrer to the evidence, from which the directed 
verdict descended,210 was too different from the modern directed 
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verdict to withstand a Seventh Amendment challenge.211  In 
particular, the dissenters noted that the demurrer to the evidence was 
quite risky because it required the demurring party to give up his 
right to present evidence: once he had admitted the truth of the 
opposing party’s evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences from 
that evidence, he could not challenge the evidence or the 
inferences.212  The directed verdict has no such rule and, therefore, 
makes it likely that more cases will be withdrawn from the jury.  The 
dissenters also complained that the evolution of the substantial 
evidence or reasonable jury standard meant that courts took cases 
from the jury under directed verdict practice that would have gone to 
the jury under demurrer to the evidence practice.213  Thus, the 
dissenters saw the decision in Galloway as part of a pattern of 
decisions that undermined the Seventh Amendment.214 
In contrast, the majority in Galloway saw their decision as the 
logical and reasonable extension of a long line of previous cases.  An 
examination of authorities relied on by the Court suggests that the 
dissenters were closer to the mark.  The reason is not so much the 
change in procedure—the directed verdict does seem to be a 
reasonable development from its common law sources—but a change 
in how the Court viewed questions of law and fact.  The issue in 
Galloway could not be classified as anything other than a question of 
fact: was Galloway permanently and totally disabled by reason of 
mental illness as of May 31, 1919, or not?  Yet the Court treated it as a 
question of law, holding that there was only one “reasonable” 
inference from the facts, and therefore that Galloway had failed to 
establish his case as a matter of law.215  After Galloway, fact has become 
law.  How did the Court get there? 
The Court in Galloway cited several cases where courts had 
directed verdicts due to insufficiency of the evidence.  Only one of 
these cases predated Munson, which had adopted the “reasonable 
jury” test for federal courts.  The early case, Parks v. Ross,216 is credited 
as the first Supreme Court case involving a directed verdict.  Decided 
in 1850, Parks involved the westward migration of the Cherokee 
Nation at the instigation of the United States in the late 1830s.  Ross, 
a Cherokee chief, was responsible for contracting with persons who 
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were helping with the migration.217  Among the items budgeted for 
was the cost of returning wagons used in the migration.218  Plaintiff’s 
intestate had owned four of the wagons, but he was a Cherokee and 
did not intend to return.219  Thus, he had settled his account in full 
with Ross, who was acting on behalf of the Cherokee Nation.220  
Nevertheless, plaintiff Parks, on behalf of the decedent’s estate, sued 
Ross personally seeking recovery of the cost of returning the wagons.221  
Following presentation of Parks’s case, Ross asked the court to 
instruct the jury that if it believed the evidence, Parks was not entitled 
to recover.222  This the court did, and the jury held for Ross.223 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that seeking the instruction 
was similar to demurring to the evidence and, therefore, would be 
tested by the same standard, which the Court described as whether 
there was “some evidence legally sufficient to establish [the fact].”224  
The question, then, was whether Parks had produced legally 
sufficient evidence that he was entitled to personally recover from 
Ross the cost of returning the wagons.  Unlike Galloway, this was a 
case in which there was no evidence supporting plaintiff’s position.  
The Court noted that Ross was a public official acting on behalf of 
the Cherokee Nation, and that such officials are not personally liable 
absent “satisfactory evidence of an absolute and unqualified 
engagement to be personally liable.”225  However, there was “no 
evidence whatever tending to show a special contract by John Ross 
personally to pay for the teams and wagons, either for going or 
returning.”226  Indeed, the plaintiff’s intestate himself had never made 
a claim for the return.227  Arguably, the budget presented some 
evidence that wagon owners would be paid for the return, but that 
did not mean that Ross was personally liable.228  Thus, there was no 
evidence to weigh.  Furthermore, because the case turned in part on 
Ross’s status as an agent for the Cherokee Nation,229 this can be 
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact. 
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In addition to Parks, the other cases cited by Galloway are 
similarly inapposite.  For example, the decision in Munson, as I have 
demonstrated, was primarily a ruling on evidence: whether the court 
should allow the jury to infer a fact when to do so would be 
inconsistent with the court’s ruling on an evidentiary presumption.230  
The existence of a presumption has always been a legal matter to be 
decided by the judge.231  Thus, the issue in Munson was quite different 
from the issue in Galloway. 
In another case cited by Galloway, Pleasants v. Fant,232 the 
question was whether the defendant Fant was a partner in a firm, a 
status that would make him liable for the firm’s debts.233  The 
evidence showed that Fant had assisted the firm in securing a loan for 
the purchase of cotton, and that the firm had voluntarily promised to 
give him a part of any profits, though no sum was agreed upon.234  
The trial court instructed the jury that there was no evidence of 
partnership, and entered judgment for Fant.235  The Supreme Court 
agreed, finding that because Fant could not have demanded an 
accounting in a court of equity, he could not be considered a 
partner.236  The Court conceded that the case might nonetheless have 
gone to the jury under earlier case law but, citing Parks v. Ross and 
Improvement Co. v. Munson, applied the reasonable jury standard.237 
Fant also differs from Galloway because there was no dispute 
about what happened, at least on the record before the Court.238  The 
outcome seemed to result from an application of what the Court 
called “one of the most approved criteria of the existence of the 
partnership,”239 the ability of the alleged partner to seek an 
accounting.  Fant, who had only a voluntary promise that the firm 
would pay him an unknown sum of money, had no power to seek an 
accounting.240  Thus, the Court’s decision can be viewed as applying 
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established law to established facts, a proper role for the judge under 
eighteenth-century English law. 
Next, the Galloway Court cited Commissioners of Marion County v. 
Clark,241 which addressed whether a plaintiff bank was a bona fide 
purchaser for value of bonds that had been issued based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations to the County.242  The lower court 
instructed the jury that there was no evidence that the bank had any 
notice of the fraud, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
bank, consistent with that instruction.243  The County objected to the 
instruction, but the Court, citing Munson and other U.S. and English 
cases employing the reasonable jury rule, found that the instruction 
was proper.244  There is little in the reported case, however, revealing 
whether there was evidence establishing the bank’s bona fide 
purchaser status.  The case report states that the County alleged in its 
answer that the bank was not a bona fide purchaser, and that the bank 
denied that allegation.245  The report’s description of the evidence is 
minimal, but it appears that the Court applied the legal rule that a 
bondholder who takes from a bona fide purchaser takes a valid title 
even if the bondholder knew of the fraud at the time he acquired the 
bonds.246  Thus, this case appears to involve an application of law to 
settled facts, and not a dispute of fact. 
In Galloway, the Court also cited Ewing v. Goode, 247 a lower court 
opinion involving a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff 
developed glaucoma following cataract surgery.248  The plaintiff 
claimed that the doctor had failed to monitor and treat her condition 
properly, resulting in the loss of one eye and impaired vision in the 
other.249  Expert testimony established that glaucoma occasionally 
follows cataract surgery, and that if it does, little can be done to treat 
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it.250  The expert witness also found nothing improper in the way the 
defendant operated on the plaintiff or in his follow-up care.251  
Although there was some dispute over whether the defendant 
adequately provided for the plaintiff’s care while the defendant was 
out of town, the court found that there was no more than a scintilla 
of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claims because the defendant 
was already treating her for glaucoma during that period despite 
scant evidence of the disease.252  Thus, the court, relying heavily on 
the expert testimony, directed a verdict for the defendant.253 
Ewing is different from the earlier cases and provides some 
support for Galloway  because the issue presented appears to be one 
of fact: did the defendant doctor give the plaintiff proper care in 
treating her eye?  Two aspects of Ewing, however, tie it to the earlier 
cases: first, the issue of negligence has some legal content; and 
second, the facts on which the court based its opinion—especially the 
fact that the doctor was already treating the plaintiff for glaucoma 
when he went away—were undisputed.  Although the evidence for 
the plaintiff was scant, this case shows movement in the lower courts 
toward more judicial decisions on issues of fact.254 
The Galloway Court also cited Southern Railway Co. v. Walters255 
and Gunning v. Cooley.256  In Walters, the plaintiff, a child who had 
been hit by a train and severely injured, sued the railway company 
alleging that it negligently failed to stop the train and flag the 
crossing as required by an order of the Illinois Commerce 
Commission.257  While this case concerned a fact dispute—whether 
the train had stopped—it also posed an evidentiary question: whether 
the court could justify excluding certain questionable testimony.  
Witnesses disagreed over whether the train had stopped.  Five 
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witnesses testified that it had stopped,258 while two witnesses testified 
that the train did not stop.  The Court found, however, that the latter 
witnesses were not in a position to see whether the train had 
stopped.259  Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiff’s evidence 
“was so insubstantial and insufficient that it did not justify a 
submission of that issue to the jury.”260  In fact, the Court said that 
“[t]here is no proof whatever that the alleged failure to stop before 
entering the crossing was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury.”261 
Finally, the Galloway Court cited Gunning v. Cooley,262 a medical 
malpractice case upholding a lower court’s refusal to direct a verdict 
for the defendant.  In Gunning, the plaintiff claimed that the doctor 
had put acid in her ears, causing severe pain and loss of hearing.263  
The defendant testified to the contrary, and physical evidence 
suggested that it was unlikely that acid had been applied to the 
plaintiff’s ears.264  Nevertheless, the court viewed the issue as turning 
on the credibility of the witnesses, and held that that was a question 
for the jury.265  In the course of reaching that conclusion, the Court 
repeated the rules governing when a case can be taken from a jury, 
including the rule requiring more than a scintilla of evidence before 
a case may go to the jury.266  That language probably explains why the 
Court in Galloway cited Gunning.  Galloway had relied on Gunning in 
arguing his cause to the Court, and his reliance was certainly 
reasonable.  If Galloway’s expert witness had been believed, there 
would have been evidence of mental illness dating to Galloway’s 
service in the war.  However, the Court never gave a jury an 
opportunity to consider the credibility of that expert. 
Galloway also relied on two other decisions, each coming within 
two years of the decision in his case and squarely on point.  In both 
cases, the Court found the evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the 
question whether the claimant had been permanently and totally 
disabled as of the date when his War Risk Insurance had expired.  In 
the earlier of the two, Berry v. United States,267 the plaintiff lost a leg 
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during World War I and subsequently failed at numerous attempts to 
hold gainful employment upon his return to the United States.  The 
Court found that the jury could have returned a verdict either way, 
such that the trial judge had properly denied the Government’s 
motion for directed verdict.268  Additionally, the Court stated that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which governs directed 
verdicts, “has not taken away from juries and given to judges any part 
of the exclusive power of juries to weigh evidence and determine 
contested issues of fact—a jury being the constitutional tribunal 
provided for trying facts in courts of law.”269 
Galloway also relied on Halliday v. United States,270 another case 
involving a claim under a War Risk Insurance policy.  Halliday’s 
disability, like Galloway’s, was mental.271  Halliday had refused to seek 
hospitalization, but he presented evidence of mental incapacity 
beginning during the life of his policy and continuing for fifteen 
years.272  Although there was no gap in the evidence, the evidence in 
Halliday was otherwise similar to that offered by Galloway.  The gap in 
Galloway, therefore, was clearly determinative. 
In Galloway, the Court cited no authority on the demurrer to the 
evidence that predated Munson other than Parks v. Ross.273  The Court 
noted, however, that practice relating to the common law devices of 
demurrer to the evidence and nonsuit was changing at the time of 
the Seventh Amendment’s ratification.274  Evidently the Court 
thought that this meant that the practice was not so hardened as to 
be an immutable part of the Seventh Amendment, but the cases the 
Court cites as examples of that changing practice are revealing.  As 
for demurrer to the evidence, the Court cited two English cases and 
invited a comparison between the two.  The earlier of the two, 
Cocksedge v. Fanshaw,275 addressed whether certain tradesmen were 
exempt from taxes on goods sold in London through third parties.  
The evidence showed that these tradesmen had been treated as 
exempt for a long period of time, but the exemption required a legal 
act, such as an Act of Parliament, in order to be given legal effect, 
and there was no evidence of such an Act.276  The court noted that on 
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a demurrer to the evidence, “the defendant admits every fact which 
the jury could have found upon the evidence.”277  The court found 
that the jury could have inferred that the practice of exempting the 
tradesmen, which concededly dated to “time immemorial,” had been 
supported initially by an Act of Parliament or other legal act that is 
no longer part of the record.278 
The Court in Galloway invited a comparison between Cocksedge 
and a later English case, Gibson v. Hunter,279 decided in 1793, and 
therefore roughly contemporaneous with the ratification of the 
Seventh Amendment.  In Gibson, which concerned an allegedly 
fraudulent bill of exchange, there was some dispute over whether the 
acceptor knew of the fraud.  The court required the party demurring 
to his opponent’s evidence to admit on the record the truth of the 
evidence, which the demurring party had not done.280  The court also 
found that the evidence was so uncertain that no judgment could be 
given, and ordered a new trial.281  As Galloway noted, comparison of 
Cocksedge and Gibson suggests a change in the practice governing 
demurrer to the evidence, but the change seems to make demurrer 
to the evidence more difficult to sustain.  Cocksedge, the earlier case, 
allowed courts to draw all inferences that the jury could have drawn 
from the evidence, but Gibson required the demurring party to admit 
everything, including inferences, on the record before his demurrer 
could be sustained.  One commentator noted that this made the 
device “cumbersome” so that “it fell into disuse soon after this 
decision.”282  Thus, the nature of the shift in demurrer to the evidence 
does not sustain Galloway’s apparent conclusion that changes in the 
demurrer to the evidence in late eighteenth century England should 
make it easier for judges to take cases from the jury. 
The Court in Galloway also sought to illustrate the changing state 
of the law by citing three state cases decided in the late 1700s and 
early 1800s.  None of these cases required the party demurring to 
admit all the facts on the record; rather they allowed the judge to 
draw inferences that the jury could have drawn against the demurring 
party.  In Patrick v. Hallett,283 a New York case, the question was 
whether a ship that had suddenly sprung a leak and sunk was 
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seaworthy.  If it was not, the insurers were relieved of liability.284  The 
court held that if the evidence allowed any inference that the ship 
was seaworthy, that inference was considered admitted by the 
demurrer.285  The court stated that this rule prevented judges from 
becoming triers of fact.286  The court then held that the sudden 
springing of a leak alone is not evidence of unseaworthiness, and thus 
the shipowner prevailed.287  The dissent, by contrast, would have 
applied a presumption that the sudden springing of a leak is prima 
facie evidence of unseaworthiness.288  The difference of opinion 
between the majority and the dissent in Patrick concerned whether an 
evidentiary presumption of unseaworthiness should apply based on 
the sudden springing of a leak.  The existence of a presumption, like 
other evidentiary rulings, is a question of law for the judge.289 
The second state court case cited by Galloway that suggested a 
change in demurrer to the evidence law was Stephens v. White,290 a legal 
malpractice action.  The question in Stephens was whether the 
defendant was an attorney of record when the alleged malpractice 
occurred.291  The case contains the language that a demurrer to the 
evidence “admits the truth of all facts which can be fairly, and 
consequently inferred from the evidence, yet that inference must grow 
necessarily out of the evidence.”292  However, that language only 
appears in the report of the parties’ arguments, not in the court’s 
opinion.  The court found no issue as to when the defendant attorney 
was employed.293  According to the court, the only indication in the 
record that he was part of the proceedings occurred in 1784, more 
than five years after the action originally commenced and long after 
the alleged malpractice.294  Thus, this might be seen as a case where 
there was no evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position. 
In Whittington v. Christian,295 the court noted a change in the 
practice of demurrer to the evidence in Virginia.  While Virginia had 
at one time followed the English practice of requiring the party 
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demurring to admit all facts that the opposing party’s evidence 
“conduced to prove,”296 the rule was now 
to consider the demurrer, as if the demurrant had admitted all 
that could reasonably be inferred by a jury, from the evidence 
given by the other party, and waived all the evidence on his part, 
which contradicts that offered by the other party, or the credit of 
which is impeached; and all inferences from his own evidence, 
which do not necessarily flow from it.297 
Thus, Whittington certainly supports Galloway’s statement that the law 
was in flux early in the country’s history, but in no way suggests that 
courts can weigh evidence as to disputed questions of fact.  Instead, 
the court is to put all the weight on the non-moving party’s side.  
Even if Whittington suggested that the judge could weigh evidence, it 
would have no bearing on the Seventh Amendment, which applies in 
federal courts but not in state courts.298 
It is also interesting to consider a case that the Court in Galloway 
did not cite, Pawling v. United States.299  The demurrer to the evidence 
was in use early in the country’s history, but its use was quite different 
from Galloway in the way it defined questions of fact and questions of 
law.  In Pawling, the issue was whether a bond had been delivered as 
an escrow conditioned on others becoming sureties on the bond.300  
There was nothing on the face of the bond suggesting it was delivered 
as an escrow.301  The Court found the evidence sufficient for a jury to 
find for either party, but on the demurrer to the evidence the 
judgment had to be for the party opposing the demurrer—in this 
case, the defendants.302  The Court stated the rule as 
[t]he party demurring admits the truth of the testimony to which 
he demurs, and also those conclusions of fact which a jury may 
fairly draw from that testimony.  Forced and violent inferences he 
does not admit; but the testimony is to be taken most strongly 
against him, and such conclusions as a jury might justifiably draw, 
the court ought to draw.303 
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This language suggests that the court can assess the reasonableness of 
a decision for the demurring party, but also makes it plain that the 
court must construe the evidence strongly against the demurring 
party.  This is, perhaps, the most significant shift between the 
demurrer to the evidence as seen in Pawling and the directed verdict 
as interpreted by Galloway, and it depends heavily on the Munson 
decision’s adoption of the reasonable jury standard. 
This review of the cases cited in Galloway suggests that Galloway 
misapplied the precedent it purportedly relied on.  Drawing on 
Munson’s reasonable jury standard, itself of questionable lineage, the 
Court in Galloway permitted a directed verdict to be entered on a 
disputed question of pure fact, when none of the authority it cited 
had gone so far. 
C.  Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict: Baltimore & Carolina 
Line, Inc. v. Redman 
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman304 predated the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by three years, and, therefore, did not use 
the term “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” but the Federal 
Rules codified the approach adopted in Redman.  The appellate court 
in Redman found that the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict for 
the plaintiff was insufficient, and ordered a new trial, believing that it 
could not order judgment for the defendant because of the Court’s 
decision in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Company.  In Slocum, the 
Court held that a court could not enter a judgment inconsistent with 
the jury’s verdict because to do so would violate the Reexamination 
Clause of the Seventh Amendment.305  Thus, the Court was limited to 
ordering a new trial, which was the practice at common law.  By 
constrast, the Supreme Court in Redman noted that the trial judge in 
that case, unlike the trial judge in Slocum, had explicitly reserved 
judgment on the sufficiency of the evidence.306  This, the Court 
found, was consistent with a well-established eighteenth century 
practice of taking a jury’s verdict subject to the court’s opinion on a 
reserved question of law.307  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure still 
follow the practice of reserving decisions on the sufficiency of 
evidence, and its constitutionality is considered settled.308 
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Once again, however, the cases cited in Redman fail to support its 
decision.  The Supreme Court in Redman did not describe the facts of 
the case at all.309  Indeed, the Court granted certiorari only on the 
question whether the court of appeals correctly held that it could not 
order a judgment to be entered for the defendant; it denied 
certiorari on the question whether the evidence in support of the 
plaintiff’s verdict was sufficient.310  The court of appeals set out the 
facts of the case in detail, however, and they tell a story considerably 
more complicated than the Supreme Court’s decision suggests.311 
The plaintiff was a ship’s cook who suffered gangrene in his left 
foot, which required amputation of the lower third of his leg.312  He 
testified that he stepped on a box slat that had a nail in it while on his 
way to work in the galley at 5:00 a.m.  He stated that there was no 
light on the deck, which was littered with debris.  He washed the foot 
with hot water, and went to work, but the next day, the foot was 
swollen and painful.  The plaintiff testified that he told the chief 
steward about the injury.  The plaintiff then went ashore, procured 
some medication for the foot, spent the night ashore, and missed the 
ship’s sailing the next day.  The foot continued to get worse until, 
almost two weeks after the initial injury, he was taken to the hospital 
by ambulance, where he was diagnosed with gangrene.  Doctors 
amputated the leg nearly two months later.  Plaintiff claimed that 
gangrene resulted from the initial injury.313 
The court of appeals, however, recited a litany of evidence that 
contradicted the plaintiff’s story.  The chief steward denied that the 
plaintiff told him about the injury.  Doctors who treated the plaintiff 
at the hospital testified that he did not tell them about the injury 
from the nail.314  The plaintiff also did not tell a medical examiner for 
his employer, who determined that he was fit to sail with the ship.315  
The plaintiff filed a claim with his company, but the written 
statement, taken down by an agent, was inconsistent with his 
testimony, and never mentioned the nail.316  The hospital doctors 
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testified that the plaintiff suffered from “dry” gangrene, which could 
not result from an injury such as he described.317  One doctor testified 
that gangrene could result from an injury like the one alleged by 
plaintiff, but that doctor did not take account of the diagnosis of 
“dry” gangrene.318 
A dissent in the case, however, gives a somewhat different view of 
the facts.  The dissent noted that the plaintiff’s testimony about 
stepping on the nail was uncontradicted and that the chief steward, 
who denied having been told about it, had apparently offered his 
testimony to the highest bidder.319  The dissent also noted that the 
plaintiff might not have mentioned the foot to the ship’s doctor 
because that doctor was on board to check for venereal disease.320  
Furthermore, the doctor who first examined the plaintiff at the 
hospital did not speak English well, and resented any questions about 
his professional ability.321  The dissent suggested that the plaintiff’s 
subsequent failure to inform other doctors about the nail could be 
attributed to the initial doctor’s dismissal of the information.  The 
dissent also found conflicting medical testimony about whether a 
wound such as the plaintiff reported could cause “dry” gangrene.322  
In addition, the dissent noted that the doctors who testified that the 
plaintiff had not suffered an infection in his foot had not seen the 
plaintiff until after gangrene had set in.323 
The defendant moved for a directed verdict and for a dismissal 
of the complaint, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a verdict for the plaintiff.324  The judge reserved his decision 
on the two motions, and sent the case to the jury.325  Based on the 
evidence presented in court, the jury found for the plaintiff and 
awarded him $5000.326  The trial judge, ruling on the reserved 
motions, then decided that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
verdict and entered judgment for the plaintiff.327  The defendant 
appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
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Second Circuit, which, in a two to one decision, produced the two 
very different views of the evidence described above.328  Thus, by the 
time the case got to the Supreme Court, four judges had considered 
the sufficiency of the evidence, with two believing that the evidence 
was sufficient, and two believing that it was not.  In spite of this 
conflict, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue.329 
The state of the “facts” in Redman is particularly telling in light of 
the authority cited for the Court’s position that the trial judge can 
enter judgment for the verdict loser if he has explicitly reserved 
decision on the sufficiency of the evidence.  In support of this 
position, the Court first noted that the Seventh Amendment 
preserves the right to a jury trial, “which existed under English 
common law when the amendment was adopted.”330  The Court later 
said that “[a]t common law there was a well-established practice of 
reserving questions of law arising during trials by jury and of taking 
verdicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved.”331 
There certainly was such a common law practice, commonly 
called the “case reserved,” but the cases that the Redman Court cited 
suggest that the Court misused the “case reserved” concept.332  For 
example, the Court cited Carleton v. Griffin,333 an English case from 
1758 in which a testator had written a will without the required 
formalities.  The testator subsequently added a codicil, which 
conformed to the requirements and acknowledged that the original 
informal will was his.334  The plaintiff, the testator’s heir at law, 
claimed certain properties the testator left to his wife and daughter 
under the informal will.335  The jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff, but two questions were “reserved for the opinion of [the] 
Court”:336 first, whether the republication of the first will by means of 
the codicil constituted a republication under the Statute of Frauds; 
and, second, whether the first will had left a freehold interest to 
either the daughter or her mother.337  The court answered both 
questions in favor of the daughter.338  The justices interpreted the first 
 
 328 Redman, 70 F.2d at 637. 
 329 Redman, 295 U.S. at 656. 
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will and the codicil as a single instrument, and then held that the will 
clearly devised the property to the daughter.339  Therefore, the court 
granted judgment for the daughter even though she had lost the jury 
verdict. 
In contrast to Redman, there was no dispute about the facts in 
Carleton because they were written plainly in the will.  The only 
question was the effect given to those facts.  Thus, the case is 
consistent with two rules followed by English courts at the time.  The 
first is that juries are to decide only disputed facts, and if the facts are 
not disputed, the court decides the application of law to the facts.340  
The second is that judges, not juries, interpret written documents.341  
Unlike the wills in Carleton, the evidence in Redman consisted largely 
of testimony—testimony that was quite inconsistent.  In other words, 
it is much easier to classify the questions at issue in Carleton as 
questions of law than the questions at issue in Redman. 
The other cases cited by the Court in Redman, which all 
concerned reserved questions of law,  are similar to Carleton.  
Coppendale v. Bridgen342 involved an action against a sheriff for a false 
return on an execution.  The facts were clear.343  A man named 
Debonaire was arrested for a debt and remained in prison for over 
two months.  He was released pursuant to his adjudication as a 
bankrupt.  While the return on the execution was due during 
Debonaire’s two months in prison, the sheriff did not actually return 
it until four months after Debonaire’s release.  At that time, the 
sheriff returned it “nulla bona.”  But the question was whether the 
sheriff, who had levied on Debonaire’s small amount of property, 
should have turned it over to the plaintiff, who had sought the 
execution.  Plaintiff alleged that on the due date, the sheriff could 
not have known that Debonaire would be adjudged a bankrupt 
because that adjudication was based on his being imprisoned for two 
months, which had not yet elapsed.344  By the time the sheriff actually 
returned the writ, Debonaire was clearly bankrupt.  The court noted 
that the statute provides that a debtor who is imprisoned for two 
months is presumed to have been bankrupt upon his incarceration.  
Thus, the sheriff’s return was proper.  Debonaire was, in fact, 
bankrupt on the original return date because of this relation back 
 
 339 Id. at 445-47.  All three justices expressed opinions, but they were unanimous. 
 340 See FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 240. 
 341 See THAYER, supra note 3, at 203-06; see also supra note 38. 
 342 2 Burr. 814, 97 Eng. Rep. 576 (1759). 
 343 The facts are set out at Coppendale, 97 Eng. Rep.at 576-77. 
 344 Id. at 577-79. 
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provision.345  Indeed, the plaintiff would have gained nothing had the 
sheriff returned the writ on the due date, because the plaintiff would 
have been required to turn the goods over to the debtor’s assignees.346  
This case, like Carleton, seems to be a clear question of law as it 
concerns the interpretation of a statute and its application to 
undisputed facts. 
The Redman Court next cited Bird v. Randall,347 a case in which 
the plaintiff obtained a verdict subject to the opinion of the court on 
a reserved question of law.  The question was whether a plaintiff who 
had recovered damages for breach of contract could also recover 
damages against the person who had allegedly induced the breach.348  
The plaintiff filed the second suit after he obtained a judgment in the 
first, but before recovering that judgment.349  The court noted that 
the plaintiff could not maintain a suit against the person who had 
induced the breach if the first judgment was paid before the second 
suit commenced.350  The court held that the result should be the same 
where the plaintiff has recovered from the first defendant before the 
second suit is tried.351  There is nothing in this case that looks 
remotely like a question of fact. 
The Court next cited Price v. Neal.352  In Price, the question 
reserved was whether a person who paid forged notes could recover 
the value from the innocent person to whom they had been paid.353  
Plaintiff’s counsel noted that it would be impossible to recover from 
the drawer because no drawer existed, nor from the forger, because 
he had been hanged for forgery.354  Although the jury found for the 
plaintiff, the court held that because the defendant had given value 
for the payments in good faith, with no suspicion of forgery, he was 
not required to pay the plaintiff.355  In other words, the plaintiff had 
the burden of ascertaining the genuineness of the notes.  Once 
again, there was no question about the facts; the only question was 
the clearly legal question about the rights of a bona fide purchaser 
for value. 
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The Redman Court next cited Basset v. Thomas,356 in which the 
reserved question was whether a lease was valid.  The court held that 
the lease was valid, in large part based on the meaning of words used 
in the document.357  In this respect, Basset is consistent with the rule 
that documents are interpreted by the judge, not the jury.  In 
addition, none of the evidence in Basset was in dispute,358 so the 
court’s holding is consistent with the rule that the judge can decide 
the legal effect of undisputed facts. 
The last eighteenth-century English case that the Redman Court 
relied on was Timmons v. Rowlinson.359  The reserved issue was whether 
the plaintiff was liable for double rent for a half year after he had 
given notice of his intent to vacate the premises, but had failed to 
leave.360  The lease and the notice of intent to vacate were both oral.  
Accordingly, the questions were, first, whether a statute that allowed 
double rent for holding over after giving notice governed oral leases, 
and, second, whether the statute governed leases for a period as short 
as a year.361  These are clearly questions of statutory construction—
questions of law—and the court decided them, finding the statute 
applicable.362 
In short, the Redman Court relied on eighteenth century English 
cases where the questions reserved significantly differed from the 
question at issue in Redman.  The earlier cases involved applications 
of law to fact, interpretations of the legal language used in 
documents, and constructions of statutes.  In Redman, by contrast, 
there was conflicting evidence on whether the defendant’s 
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury.363  The Redman Court, 
however, ignored that conflicting evidence and chose not to 
reconsider the lower court’s two to one decision that the evidence 
was so one-sided as to render the factual dispute a question of law.364 
In addition to these cases, Redman also cited a number of 
treatises.  While most merely mention the rule governing the case 
reserved,365 Thayer’s evidence treatise is more illuminating.  Thayer 
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says little about the practice of reserving questions on his own 
account,366 but he does report at length on what Lord Blackburn said 
about the practice in the late 1800s.367  This report is not particularly 
relevant to English practice in the late 1700s, as the law can change 
dramatically in a hundred years.  If the Court, however, had reviewed 
Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Co. v. Slattery,368 the case cited in 
Thayer’s treatise, it would have found that Lord Blackburn was a 
dissenter in that case, and that the majority made it clear that when 
evidence is in dispute, the question is for the jury.369  The Dublin case 
concerned a railroad accident in which a train hit and killed a man 
while he was crossing the tracks at a station.370  The plaintiff alleged 
that the railroad’s engineer negligently failed to blow the train’s 
whistle.371  The defendant claimed that the decedent was 
contributorily negligent in failing to take adequate precautions when 
crossing the track.372  A jury found for the plaintiff, who was the widow 
of the deceased, but the railroad contended that there was no 
evidence of its own negligence but ample evidence showing that the 
deceased was contributorily negligent.373  Finding that evidence 
existed in plaintiff’s favor on both counts, the majority allowed the 
verdict to stand even though the evidence was weak.374  In particular, 
there was some question about whether the train’s engineer had 
actually blown the whistle.375  More importantly, while there was 
evidence suggesting that the deceased might have seen the train 
coming if he had exercised care, crossing the tracks was necessary in 
order to buy a ticket, and the deceased crossed at a spot that had 
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become customary for making the crossing.376  In light of this 
uncertainty as to the facts, the case stands for the traditional rule in 
England that the jury decides any factual disputes.377 
The Redman Court also referred to three later English cases in 
support of the practice of reserving questions of law.  The first, 
Treacher v. Hinton,378 did not involve the case reserved, but rather a 
procedure more akin to a directed verdict.  In Treacher, the acceptor 
of a bill of exchange was sued by the plaintiff-indorsee after the bank 
refused payment.379  The plaintiff  failed to prove that he had given 
notice of non-payment to the defendant acceptor. The court 
nonsuited the plaintiff, with leave for the plaintiff to seek a judgment 
based on a question of law.380  The question of law was whether the 
acceptance had the legal effect of requiring the acceptor to pay 
regardless of whether he was given notice of the bank’s non-
payment.381  The court answered this legal question in the affirmative 
and ordered judgment for the plaintiff.382  Interestingly, two of the 
judges, in answering the question whether the court could enter 
judgment for the plaintiff, as opposed to nonsuiting him, employed a 
legal fiction: because the trial judge had nonsuited the plaintiff and 
given him leave to move for a judgment in the hearing of the jury, 
the jury was presumed to have  consented to the judgment.383  More 
to the point, there was no dispute about what happened in the case; 
the only existing dispute was the legal effect of the facts. 
The Court also cited Jewell v. Parr384 and Ryder v. Wombwell,385 both 
of which had been relied on in Improvement Co. v. Munson386 in 
support of the reasonable jury standard.387  Neither of those cases, 
however, supports the outcome in Redman.  As I have noted, Jewell 
concerned the question whether an acceptor of a bill of exchange 
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could escape liability by testifying that the bill had been paid by the 
drawer.388  The court, relying largely on the rule that an acceptor in 
such circumstances is generally liable to the holder but has recourse 
against the drawer, did not allow the jury verdict in favor of the 
acceptor to stand, even though the jury could have believed the 
acceptor’s testimony.389  Thus, the Jewell ruling was more legal than 
factual. 
Similarly, the court in Ryder relied largely on a legal rule: one 
who seeks to establish that jewels and other luxury items are 
“necessaries” so as to overcome the defense of minority in a breach of 
contract action must produce an affirmative evidence showing that 
the goods are necessary to the person’s station in life.390  Thus, Ryder 
was a case where there was no evidence for the plaintiff on the 
disputed question.  Neither case is anything like Redman, where there 
was a substantial dispute as to a pure question of fact. 
The Court in Redman noted that some of its own earlier cases 
had approved of the case reserved.  The earliest was the 1809 case, 
Brent v. Chapman,391 which addressed whether ownership of a slave 
had passed from the estate of the father to his son.392  Creditors of 
both the father and the son claimed the slave.393  The jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff, a creditor of the son, subject to the opinion 
of the court on an agreed set of facts.394  The Court found that, while 
not formally administered, the father’s estate provided for transfer of 
the slave to the son because of the assent of an executor who was 
competent to assent to the division of property.395  Thus, the court 
held that the slave was the property of the son.396  The legal effect of 
an executor’s assent seems primarily a question of law.  Thus, this 
case is consistent with the early English cases in that the facts are 
undisputed, and only their legal effect was at issue, and the case 
differs from Redman. 
Another case relied on by Redman, Chinoweth v. Haskell,397 also 
presented a distinct question of law.  This case was an ejectment 
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action in which a land grant was inconsistent with a survey.398  The 
plaintiff’s survey encompassed land that the defendants occupied, but 
the defendants argued that the grant did not include this land.399  
The defendants demurred to the evidence, and the jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff subject to a ruling on the demurrer.400  The 
Court found that the grant prevailed largely because the sloppily 
performed survey401 conformed neither to the courses and distances 
in the grant, nor to the general description of the property in the 
grant.402  On its face, this appears to be a case where evidence was in 
dispute and the Court decided it inconsistently with the jury verdict.  
It can also be read, however, as turning largely on the Court’s 
interpretation of documents, which in eighteenth century England, 
was a job for the judge.  Indeed, the Court notes that “neither the 
grant nor the face of the plat furnishes any information by which the 
corner called for in the grant can be controlled.”403  In other words, 
the plaintiff presented no evidence to support his position that the 
survey should prevail over the grant. 
Finally, the Redman Court cited Suydam v. Williamson,404 an 
ejectment action that turned entirely on the procedural niceties of 
the method of appeal.  The Court in Suydam mentioned the practice 
of the case reserved,405 but found that the lower court had not taken 
proper steps to reserve questions of law.406  Indeed, the Court found 
that that the trial court had used no recognized method of 
questioning the judgment and it affirmed judgment for the 
plaintiffs.407  Thus, while the Supreme Court acknowledged the case 
reserved procedure during the early to mid-nineteenth century, its 
practice was generally consistent with English practice. 
This survey of cases reveals that Redman, like Munson, read far 
too much into the cases upon which it relied.  While English 
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common law practice had a procedure whereby jury verdicts could be 
taken subject to later decisions by the court on questions of law, the 
reserved questions in the English cases really were questions of law.  
Eighteenth century English judges surely would be surprised to see 
Redman decided by the court as if no dispute of fact existed.  By 
incorporating the reasonable jury standard enunciated in Munson, 
the Redman Court treated disputed facts as law.  Under this approach, 
judges can decide matters that juries would have decided in 1791. 
D.  Summary Judgment: The Trilogy 
The summary judgment has much more recent origins than 
either the directed verdict or the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.408  In both England and the United States, summary 
proceedings were unknown until the middle of the nineteenth 
century.409  Even then, they were restricted to specific kinds of 
proceedings, and generally favored plaintiffs.410  Specifically, summary 
proceedings were designed to help commercial plaintiffs get quick 
relief against defaulting debtors.411  Nevertheless, the theory behind 
summary judgment is similar to the rationale for various procedures 
and doctrines that were well-established in the common law at the 
time of the Seventh Amendment’s ratification. 
For example, the theory behind the demurrer to the evidence, 
as stated in Gibson v. Hunter,412 was that while the jury decides the facts 
and the judge decides the law, the usual practice was for the judge to 
instruct the jury and then for the jury to “compound their verdict of 
the law and fact.”413  The demurrer to the evidence was a way for a 
party to withdraw the decision as to the law from the jury.414  Summary 
judgment, which allows the judge to apply the law to undisputed 
facts, similarly withdraws the legal aspects of the case from the jury. 
In 1902, the Supreme Court approved an early form of summary 
judgment in Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland v. United States.415  
Indeed, this is the only Supreme Court case that has considered the 
constitutionality of any form of summary judgment.416  At issue in 
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Fidelity was a court rule providing that in contract actions, a plaintiff 
could file an affidavit along with his complaint, setting out his case 
and arguing that he would be entitled to judgment unless the 
defendant filed his own affidavit setting out his case and showing a 
proper defense to the action.417  The defendant in Fidelity, an alleged 
surety on several contracts, filed an affidavit denying knowledge of 
the contracts it was supposed to have secured and demanded a trial 
by jury.418  Apparently believing that the affidavit was insufficient to 
state a defense, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiff, the 
United States.419  The Supreme Court held that this rule did not 
deprive the defendant of his right to jury trial, as it provided a means 
by which the defendant could raise an issue triable to a jury.420  As the 
defendant had failed to state facts that could defeat the plaintiff’s 
claim, the Court upheld the judgment against the defendant.421  
Modern summary judgment procedure is similar, in that it allows the 
party opposing summary judgment to raise issues of fact, thus 
requiring a trial by jury if properly demanded.422 
Modern summary judgment procedure began with the 
enactment of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It 
allows the court to grant summary judgment for either the plaintiff or 
the defendant if she establishes that “there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.”423  To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the party 
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the . . . party’s pleading, but the . . . party’s 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”424  
This means that the party must produce evidence that would be 
admissible at trial.425 
When hearing motions for summary judgment, courts 
traditionally have been protective of the right to a jury trial, taking 
care to give the case to the jury when issues of fact, including issues of 
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credibility, are raised.426  But in 1986, the Supreme Court decided 
three cases, commonly referred to as “the trilogy,” that made it easier 
for courts to grant motions for summary judgment.427  In Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett,428 the Court held that summary judgment would be proper 
where the moving party shows that the non-moving party has no 
evidence on an essential element of her claim or defense and the 
non-moving party has the burden of proof on that issue.429  It is not 
necessary for the moving party to produce affirmative evidence that 
there is no factual support for her opponent’s claim.430  While this was 
not a significant departure from the general practice at that time, the 
Court in Celotex encouraged lower courts to make greater use of 
summary judgment, noting that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather 
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action.’”431  In other words, courts should not be reluctant to 
use the device. 
The Court made it easier for the lower courts to grant summary 
judgment in two other cases decided that same term.  In Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby,432 the Court first made it clear that in evaluating motions 
for summary judgment, courts should apply the reasonable jury 
standard.433  The Court then said that courts should take account of 
heightened standards of proof when deciding summary judgment 
motions.434  Specifically, when the standard of proof on an issue is 
“clear and convincing evidence” rather than “a preponderance of the 
evidence,” the question that the court must answer is whether a 
reasonable jury could find that there was clear and convincing 
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evidence for the non-moving party’s claim or defense.435  In other 
words, Anderson mandates that judges do some initial weighing of 
evidence in deciding summary judgment motions; it allows judges to 
put their thumbs on the scale.  This decision provoked a strong 
dissent from Justice Brennan who could not “square the direction 
that the judge ‘is not himself to weigh the evidence’ with the 
direction that the judge also bear in mind the ‘quantum’ of proof 
required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient ‘caliber 
or quantity’ to meet that ‘quantum.’”436 
Finally, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,437 
the Court held that summary judgment was proper in an antitrust 
case where the alleged motive to engage in a predatory pricing 
conspiracy was unreasonable.  The alleged conspiracy was to maintain 
artificially high prices in Japan for various consumer electronic 
products, while maintaining artificially low prices in the United States 
for the purpose of driving American manufacturers out of the 
market.438  At the time of the Court’s decision, the conspiracy 
allegedly had been going on for as long as thirty years.439  The Court 
found that evidence of high prices in Japan was irrelevant to the 
alleged conspiracy to charge artificially low prices in the United 
States, even though that mechanism allegedly allowed the conspiracy 
to continue.440  The Court reasoned that “[l]ack of motive bears on 
the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from 
ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive 
to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally 
plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference 
of conspiracy.”441  The Court found that the Japanese manufacturers 
had no rational motive to engage in a predatory pricing conspiracy 
because: (1) the American manufacturers were larger and better 
established; (2) the alleged conspiracy had been going on for at least 
twenty years with no appreciable effect; and (3) there is no guarantee 
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cases, decided three months before Celotex and Anderson. 
 438 Id. at 578. 
 439 See id. at 578, 591 n.13.  The Supreme Court’s decision was in 1986.  The suit 
was commenced in 1974, see id. at 577, and the conspiracy allegedly began as early as 
1953, though it could have been as late as 1960.  See id. at 591 n.13. 
 440 See id. at 595-96. 
 441 Matsushita, at 596-97. 
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that the alleged conspirators could recoup the losses they suffered 
while maintaining artificially low prices in the American market.442  In 
the absence of a rational motive, the Court found the evidence 
insufficient to permit a jury to infer a predatory pricing conspiracy.443 
To some extent, Matsushita may be an artifact of antitrust law, 
which does not permit the jury to infer conspiracies if the evidence is 
equally capable of supporting legal competitive behavior.444  In other 
words, there is a heightened standard of proof in antitrust cases.445  
That rule in itself, however, is arguably inconsistent with the 
historical allocation of fact-finding—including the drawing of 
inferences—to the jury.446  The Court has held that the Seventh 
Amendment fully applies to statutory actions,447 including antitrust 
actions. 
Indeed, four justices dissented in Matsushita, and accused the 
majority of mandating that a judge considering a summary judgment 
motion in an antitrust case “should go beyond the traditional 
summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the 
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.”448  The dissent accused the 
majority of ignoring a substantial and significant report of an expert 
witness, and of preferring “its own economic theorizing to [the 
expert’s].”449  The expert witness’s report, if believed, supported not 
only the existence of the alleged conspiracy, but also a reasonable 
motive for it.450 
The three cases in the “trilogy”—Celotex, Anderson, and 
Matsushita—permit judges to take cases away from juries under 
 
 442 See id. at 597. 
 443 Id. at 574-75. 
 444 See Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 759-60 n.6, 763-64 (1984). 
 445 See Mollica, supra note 114, at 154 and n.81 (citing cases). 
 446 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 406-11 (1943) (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also Brockbank v. Anderson, 135 Eng. Rep. 124, 131 (1844); Wright v. 
Pindar, 82 Eng. Rep. 892 (1681); FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 222; THAYER, supra note 3, 
at 194. 
 447 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974); see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Arizona, 738 F.2d 
1021, 1024-31 (9th Cir. 1973).  It could be argued that Congress can change the law 
by imposing a heightened standard of proof, especially for causes of action that it 
creates.  Cf., e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-90 (1990) (finding that 
Congress had lowered the standard of proof for exceptions to discharge in 
bankruptcy). 
 448 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 600 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting).  Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Stevens. See id. 
 449 Id. at 603. 
 450 See id. at 601-03, 606. 
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conditions unlike anything seen in eighteenth century England.  
While judges in eighteenth century England could decide the 
application of law to fact—the theory behind summary judgment—
they did so only when the facts were undisputed.  Current summary 
judgment jurisprudence allows judges to make dispositive 
determinations of fact under the guise of the reasonable jury 
standard.  Moreover, there is considerable evidence that judges have 
used the Supreme Court’s permission from the trilogy to do just that. 
A recent study that compared appellate cases decided in 1973 
with cases decided in 1997-98 found that “certain inquiries deemed 
factual in 1973—especially indeterminate legal standards such as state 
of mind or reasonableness—transmuted into questions of law by the 
end of the study period.”451  That study found that judges “demanded 
more rigorous proof to rebut a Rule 56 [summary judgment] 
motion” in the later years.452  Other studies have found an increase in 
the number of summary judgments granted since the trilogy, 
especially for defendants.453  An examination of these studies’ data 
and the cases analyzed in these studies reveal judges deciding 
disputed questions of fact—something judges were less willing to do 
prior to the trilogy.454 
E.  The Linkage of Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, and Summary Judgment 
Directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and 
summary judgment all trace their origins to a hodgepodge of 
common law procedures that were designed, in part, to police the 
law/fact distinction.  Thus, demurrer to the evidence, precursor to 
the directed verdict, amounted to an argument that the opposing 
party had failed to produce evidence on a critical element of her 
claim.  Judgment notwithstanding the verdict traces to the case 
reserved, by which the judges allowed the jury to proceed to a verdict 
while reserving a question of law for later decision.  Summary 
judgment has no clear procedural ancestor, but the general common 
law rule that judges could decide the application of law to undisputed 
 
 451 Mollica, supra note 114, at 142. 
 452 Id. 
 453 See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 91-93 (1990); see also Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts 
and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA 
Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 208 (1993). 
 454 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 453, at 91; see also International 
Union v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority decided questions of fact). 
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facts reflects the same principle.455 
From these distinct but related beginnings, the three procedures 
are now clearly linked under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The Supreme Court itself has linked summary judgment and directed 
verdict in its holding that the directed verdict standard (the 
reasonable jury standard) applies to summary judgment.456  If 
summary judgment traces to the common law rule that judges could 
decide the application of law to undisputed facts, this linkage effects 
an expansion of summary judgment: the reasonable jury standard 
allows judges to make some determinations of disputed facts on the 
theory that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute only one way. 
In 1991, changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
completed the linkage by eliminating the terms “directed verdict” 
and “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” and substituting 
“judgment as a matter of law” for both.  The Advisory Committee’s 
notes to the 1991 amendment to Rule 50 describe the rationale for 
the change: 
The term “judgment as a matter of law” is . . . [a] familiar term 
and appears in the text of Rule 56 [governing summary 
judgment]; its use in Rule 50 [governing what used to be termed 
directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict] calls 
attention to the relationship between the two rules.  Finally, the 
change enables the rule to refer to preverdict and post-verdict 
motions with a terminology that does not conceal the common 
identity of two motions made at different times in the 
proceeding.457 
Thus, the three motions are described as identical but for the timing.  
And if they are identical, the same standard—the reasonable jury 
standard—must apply to all of them.  If this was not clear to everyone 
before the 1991 amendments, it surely must be after. 
The reasonable jury standard is critical to this linkage.  Under 
the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause no fact found by a 
jury can be reexamined other than according to the rules of the 
common law.458  With the development of the reasonable jury 
standard, judges became more willing to take cases away from the 
jury prior to the verdict by means of a directed verdict.  Judges 
 
 455 See supra notes 408-22 and accompanying text.  There were numerous now-
extinct common-law procedures that reflected this principle.  See Henderson, supra 
note 43, at 300-16 (discussing case reserved, demurrer to the evidence, and the old 
j.n.o.v.). 
 456 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
 457 FED. R. CIV. P. 50 adv. comm. notes (1991 amendment). 
 458 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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remained reluctant, however, to apply the reasonable jury standard to 
post-verdict motions because of the Reexamination Clause.  Redman 
resolved their doubts by allowing a post-verdict judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict if the judge had reserved decision on a 
motion for directed verdict.459  Eventually, Rule 50 provided that a 
judge who denied a motion for directed verdict was deemed to have 
reserved the question until after the verdict.460  This fiction continues 
to this day, as Rule 50 still permits a post-verdict motion for judgment 
as a matter of law (to use modern terminology) only if such a motion 
is made prior to a verdict.461 
On the one hand, the Rule 50 fiction seems unnecessary.  As I 
have shown, the development of the reasonable jury standard has 
transformed what were once questions of fact for the jury into 
questions of law for the judge.  If the court rules that no reasonable 
jury could have found for the verdict winner as a matter of law, then 
the court is not reexamining facts found by the jury.  On the other 
hand, courts remain uncomfortable with this approach, clinging to 
the fiction that they are not reexamining facts, but delaying a 
decision on a pre-verdict motion.  Framing judges’ role this way links 
the procedure to the common law, even if the substance reflected in 
those common law procedures differs vastly from the substance 
reflected in their modern counterparts.  This procedural scheme, 
however, clearly allows—and even encourages—judges to tread 
heavily on the jury’s territory, while hiding behind legal fiction. 
This examination of the cases that the Court has relied on in 
orchestrating the transformation of fact into law reveals several 
things.  First, the reasonable jury standard on which the entire 
symphony depends was not developed in England until the middle of 
the nineteenth century, sixty years after ratification of the Seventh 
Amendment—and did not make its way into Supreme Court 
jurisprudence until nearly twenty years after that.  Second, demurrers 
to the evidence, which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, 
were generally directed at a complete lack of evidence, at 
inadmissible evidence, or—and this was a later development—at 
evidence relating to mixed questions of law and fact.  Third, 
eighteenth century English cases employing the “case reserved,” 
which is the basis for the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, quite 
 
 459 Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). 
 460 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 461 Id. (“If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have 
submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal 
questions raised by the motion.”). 
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clearly involved reserved questions of law, or at most mixed questions 
of law and fact.  Finally, in eighteenth century England, disputed 
questions of fact went to the jury.  None of these eighteenth century 
procedures support the proposition that courts can decide disputed 
questions of fact simply because the evidence is extremely one-sided. 
Recent Supreme Court cases suggest some retrenchment in the 
approach to defining matters as fact or law.  As one commentator has 
detailed, the Court overturned judgments as a matter of law several 
times in the late twentieth century, insisting that the matter was for 
the jury to decide.462  These cases include Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc.,463 where the Court held that the question whether the 
plaintiff’s dismissal from his job was due to age discrimination was a 
question for the jury;464 Hunt v. Cromartie,465 where the Court held that 
summary judgment was not an appropriate vehicle for determining a 
state legislature’s motivation in creating congressional districts;466 and 
Bragdon v. Abbott,467 where the Court held that the question whether a 
person’s HIV-positive status posed a direct threat to a dentist who had 
refused to treat her was a question for the jury.468  Whether such 
decisions restrain the lower courts in their rush to judgments as a 
matter of law remains to be seen.469  However, this examination of the 
case law reveals that the problem dates back much farther than we 
have been willing to acknowledge. 
IV.  MARKMAN AND HISTORY: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Having reviewed the history of the law/fact distinction, it is 
appropriate to consider how Markman might affect the jurisprudence 
of the law/fact distinction.  While Markman may be limited to its 
context of patent claim interpretation, the language is broader than 
that.  This section describes the Markman opinion in more detail and 
then analyzes how it might affect the jurisprudence of the law/fact 
distinction. 
 
 462 See Mollica, supra note 114, at 205-18. 
 463 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 464 Id. at 146-48. 
 465 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
 466 Id. at 553. 
 467 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 468 Id. at 652-55. 
 469 One commentator has argued that the lower courts have shown considerably 
more enthusiasm for taking cases away from the jury than the Supreme Court in 
recent decades.  See Schnapper, supra note 114.  The Supreme Court cannot police 
all of the cases where matters are taken out of the hands of the jury, even if it thinks 
the lower courts are going too far. 
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A.  The Markman Decision 
A claim is the part of a patent that describes the unique features 
of the invention.470  The patent at issue in Markman was for an 
inventory tracking system for dry cleaning establishments.471  The 
question was whether a system that tracked accounts receivable but 
not articles of clothing infringed Markman’s patent for a system that 
tracked both.472  The jury found an infringement, but the district 
court granted the defendant’s deferred motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.473  The court’s decision turned on its interpretation of 
the claim in Markman’s patent, which the court construed as 
encompassing both cash inventory and inventory of clothing.474  The 
question on appeal was whether the district court had properly taken 
this decision out of the hands of the jury.475  The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that construction of a claim in a patent is “the 
exclusive province of the court”476 and the Supreme Court agreed. 
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Souter, 
described its task in terms of both the law/equity and law/fact 
distinctions.477  As for the law/equity distinction, the Court noted the 
historical test and determined quickly and easily that juries were a 
feature of patent infringement litigation in England in 1791.478  The 
Court then said that the next question was “whether the particular 
trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance 
of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”479  The Court noted 
 
 470 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1996). 
 471 Id. at 374. 
 472 Id. at 374-75. 
 473 Id. at 375. 
 474 See id. 
 475 Id. at 371. 
 476 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
 477 Id. at 372-73. 
 478 Id. at 377.  The Court did not spend much time on this issue, perhaps because 
it was obvious.  Patent infringement cases tended to be brought as actions on the 
case, a common law action.  See, e.g., Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1787).  
The usual test for determining whether a case is subject to the Seventh Amendment 
has two parts, with the first being whether the matter would have been tried in a 
court of law in England in 1791or whether it was analogous to a legal cause of action.  
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 
564-65 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).  The second part of 
the test is whether the remedy is legal or equitable, which the Court has 
characterized as the more important of the two inquiries.  See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565; 
see also Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18, 420-21.  The Court in Markman never discussed the 
remedy, perhaps because the first part of the test provided such a clear answer.  The 
Court in both Terry and Tull determined that the first part of the test did not 
definitively resolve the question, so it had to turn to the second prong of the analysis. 
 479 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
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that this question had been answered in the past by referring to the 
distinction between substance and procedure or between fact and 
law, but reasoned that “the sounder course, when available, is to 
classify a mongrel practice . . . by using the historical method, much 
as we do in characterizing the suits and actions in which they arise.”480  
The Court went on to say that “where there is no exact antecedent, 
the best hope lies in comparing the modern practice to earlier ones 
whose allocation to court or jury we do know.”481  In other words, the 
court finds an analogous issue, and decides whether the analogous 
issue was normally decided by the judge or the jury in England in 
1791. 
The Court then examined eighteenth century English patent 
cases, analogizing the modern patent claim to the eighteenth century 
“specification.”482  The Court noted that there were few reported cases 
dealing with the interpretation of disputed terms in a specification, 
but that “none demonstrates that the definition of such a term was 
determined by the jury.”483  The cases reveal that juries regularly 
decided whether the patent covered a new invention (novelty) and 
whether the invention could be built from the specification in the 
patent (enablement).484  Markman had argued that in deciding such 
matters, juries must have decided the meaning of disputed terms in 
the specification.485  The Court, however, apparently believed that 
courts could, and did, tell the jurors what the disputed terms meant 
before sending them off to decide novelty or enablement.486 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied partly on the lack 
of a clear statement in the cases that juries were to interpret terms in 
the specification, but also on the general rule that judges, and not 
juries, interpreted written documents in eighteenth century 
England.487  The Court found nothing to suggest that this rule was not 
followed in patent cases.488  The Court also rejected Markman’s claim 
that juries regularly interpreted terms of art in written documents, 
 
 480 Id. at 378. 
 481 Id. 
 482 See id. at 379-80. 
 483 Id. at 380.  In one of the cases cited, however, the judge, Lord Kenyon, told the 
jury that the invention was not new, and that they should find for the defendant, but 
the report notes that “[t]he jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the verdict was 
not afterwards disturbed.” Bramah v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. Pat. Cas. 168, 171-72 (K.B. 
1789). 
 484 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 379-83. 
 485 Id. at 381. 
 486 See id. at 382. 
 487 Id. at 381-82. 
 488 Id. at 381-83. 
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finding no evidence from late eighteenth century England suggesting 
that juries interpreted terms of art in patent cases.489 
Finding no evidence that juries interpreted patent specifications 
at common law, the Court then determined that it must “look 
elsewhere to characterize this determination of meaning in order to 
allocate it as between court or jury.”490  The Court noted that it should 
“accordingly consult existing precedent and consider both the 
relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory 
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.”491  In other 
words, the Court looked to both U.S. precedent and policy to 
determine if the eighteenth century rule should be altered so as to 
allow a jury to interpret patent claims.  This suggests that the Court 
was willing to permit a jury to interpret patent claims based on 
precedent or policy.  However, the Court ultimately found that 
neither factor supported that result.492 
Whether or not the Court had taken this historical approach 
before,493 it is a new way of describing how courts draw what is 
commonly called the law/fact distinction.  Indeed, the Court seemed 
to treat the law/fact distinction as simply one way of defining the 
 
 489 Id. at 383-84. 
 490 Markman, 517 U.S. at 384. 
 491 Id. at 384. 
 492 The Court found that the precedent distinguished between the written patent 
and the actual invention, and gave to the jury questions about the “‘character of the 
thing invented.’”  Id. at 386 (quoting Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 816 
(1869)).  The Court also found that nineteenth century commentators generally 
noted that claim construction was for the court.  Id. at 387-88.  Finally, as to matters 
of policy, the Court found that both the judges’ “special training in exegesis,” id. at 
388, and the need for uniformity in patent construction meant that claim 
construction should be given to the judge.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91. 
 493 In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court first determined that the 
claim for a civil penalty under the Clean Water Act was analogous to a legal action, 
and so required a jury, see id. at 417-25, and then turned to the question whether a 
jury was required to assess the amount of a civil penalty.  See id. at 425-27.  In 
answering the second question, the Court noted that Congress could itself determine 
the amount of a civil penalty, and described a similar power in Parliament during the 
eighteenth century.  Id. (citing Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1147-49 (K.B. 
1775)); see also id. at 426.  Because the amount of the civil penalty could be 
determined by the legislature, the Court concluded, the “substance of a common-law 
right to a trial by jury” does not include the determination of the amount of a civil 
penalty.  Id.  Thus, as in Markman, the Court in Tull attempted to define the 
“substance of a common-law right” to a jury trial by looking at history, though the 
examination of history in Tull was not as sweeping as it was in Markman.  This would 
not be the first time that the Court hinted at an approach in one case and made the 
approach more explicit in a later case.  For example, the Court’s two-step approach 
to defining the distinction between law and equity for purposes of the Seventh 
Amendment was hinted at in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), but did not 
become explicit until thirteen years later with the decision in Tull. 
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substance of the common law right to a jury trial.  The Court 
reasoned that the best way to define the substance of the right is 
through history.  That analysis raises interesting questions about the 
use of the reasonable jury standard, directed verdict, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and summary judgment. 
B.  The Future of the Law/Fact Distinction 
Markman calls into question all of the development described in 
this article.  If we are to look to history to define the contours of the 
right that is preserved by the Seventh Amendment we will surely have 
to backtrack from the conclusions of Munson, Galloway, Redman, and 
the trilogy.  It is insufficient to quote empty words, or to cite 
unexamined cases, as the Court repeatedly did in sanctioning the 
expansion of judicial power reflected by these cases.  Rather, if we are 
to understand the history that the Court now seems prepared to 
invoke, we must look at the circumstances behind the words of the 
eighteenth century English and early American cases relied on by the 
Court.  Those circumstances belie the conclusions that the Court has 
drawn in Munson, Galloway, Redman, and the trilogy.  There was no 
reasonable jury standard in eighteenth century English cases.  The 
demurrer to the evidence was not used to resolve disputed questions 
of pure fact, and neither was the case reserved.  Judges applied law to 
undisputed facts, but if facts were disputed, they sent cases to the jury.  
Finally, although early U.S. cases said that courts were not bound by 
eighteenth century English procedures, the procedural changes that 
the Court had approved prior to Munson and Galloway left fact-
finding in the jury’s hands. 
Of course, this too may paint too simplistic a picture.  The 
law/fact distinction had its bumps and detours in eighteenth century 
England as well.  It has never been the case that juries always found 
all of the facts; some kinds of facts had to be determined by the 
judge.494  An example given by a number of writers is that judges, not 
juries, determined whether probable cause for prosecution existed in 
a suit for malicious prosecution.495  Of course, one can see some legal 
content to such a question, so it might more accurately be deemed a 
mixed question of law and fact: probable cause for a criminal 
prosecution is tied up with policy decisions that protect both the 
 
 494 See THAYER, supra note 3, at 184-85.  For discussions of the law/fact distinction, 
including the somewhat arbitrary classifications of law and fact employed in 
eighteenth century England, see the materials cited supra note 3. 
 495 See FORSYTH, supra note 3; see also THAYER, supra note 3, at 221-22, 252; GREEN, 
supra note 3, at 280. 
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accused and the accuser. 
Another example of arbitrariness in defining law and fact is the 
distinction at issue in Markman: judges, not juries, decided the 
meaning of written documents in eighteenth century England, even 
if such inquires look like questions of fact.  There were complications 
to this common law doctrine, however.  First, courts sometimes called 
upon juries to interpret terms of art in written documents on the 
theory that jurors, who were themselves steeped in the useful arts, 
would have a better understanding of what those terms meant than 
the more removed judges.496  The Court in Markman considered this 
complication, but decided that it did not apply in that case because 
the earliest patent case cited for the proposition was decided in 1841, 
well after the ratification of the Seventh Amendment.497 
Of course, if it was illegitimate to cite an 1841 case to define the 
Seventh Amendment in Markman, it was also illegitimate to cite an 
1853 case, Jewell v. Parr, for a similar purpose in Munson.  Moreover, 
Munson, with its reliance on Jewell, is the basis for the decisions in 
Galloway, Redman, and the trilogy.  If Markman was serious about 
relying on history to define the contours of the Seventh Amendment 
right to jury trial, then the entire structure must collapse.  Even if the 
structure still stands, however, my examination of the facts of the 
cases that the Court has relied on to define the law/fact distinction 
reveals that the structure has serious flaws.  The cases simply do not 
support the conclusions that the Court reaches. 
It might be argued that whatever the legitimacy of relying on an 
1853 English case in the first place, the doctrine borrowed from that 
case is now too well established to deny.  Markman itself suggested 
that post-1791 U.S. precedent could affect the right to a jury trial.498  
But, Markman would have used such precedent to allow a jury trial 
where history did not demand one.  It is quite another matter to 
allow such precedent to have continuing force when it becomes clear 
that it has failed the Seventh Amendment mandate to “preserve” the 
right to a jury trial. 
 
 496 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.  Markman noted that there is some evidence that 
this doctrine was in its early development in the late 1700s.  See id. at 383-84, n.9 
(citing 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2461, at 195 
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981)). 
 497 The Court cited Wigmore on Evidence for the proposition that the allocation to 
juries of the interpretation of terms of art in documents generally was not well 
established at the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified, but considered it 
irrelevant anyway given that Markman was a patent case.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 383-84 
(citing 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2461, at 195). 
 498 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91. 
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The historical approach, however, is not without difficulty.  In 
fact, the history is sometimes quite murky, as Markman itself 
illustrates.  Relying on that history would require litigants and judges 
to search through old English cases in hopes of gleaning the English 
classification of a particular issue.  Such research could be difficult to 
do, both because those cases are not going to be readily accessible to 
many lawyers and judges, and because the cases themselves are 
difficult to interpret.  Many are written in archaic legal language and 
employ archaic common law procedural devices that are not well 
known to modern lawyers.  Furthermore, the case reports vary 
considerably in clarity and completeness.  Some are just two or three 
sentences, while others go on for pages.  The Court and 
commentators have criticized the historical approach to the 
law/equity distinction,499 and if anything, the difficulties of doing 
historical research would be greater in dealing with the law/fact 
distinction.  There are also instances where modern juries decide 
issues that historically were given to judges in eighteenth century 
England, and some question about how to handle such matters would 
arise.  Again, Markman provides an example.  Eighteenth century 
English judges interpreted written documents, largely on the theory 
that words had immutable legal meanings.  We no longer have such 
confidence in the clarity of words, and courts instead look to the 
intent of the parties as reflected in  the document.  For the most part, 
we leave questions of such intent to juries.500  In theory, Markman 
could return document interpretation to the judge, though that is 
one area where post-1791 U.S. precedent might supersede history. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For well over one hundred years, courts have found procedural 
excuses for taking questions of fact away from juries.  The courts have 
relied on eighteenth century English practice to justify their action, 
arguing that modern procedures are mere variations on the English 
themes.  This whole symphony, however, is built on a theme that does 
not exist: the reasonable jury standard was not announced in 
England until 1853, well after the relevant date for determining what 
the Seventh Amendment preserves.  Moreover, a comparison of the 
kinds of issues taken from juries in eighteenth century England with 
 
 499 See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 574-81 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).  See also 
Redish, supra note 108 (criticizing the historical approach). 
 500 See, e.g., Dobson v. Masonite Corp., 359 F.2d 921, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1966); cf. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (classifying the interpretation of documents as fact-finding for 
purposes of establishing the appellate standard of review of fact-finding by judges). 
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those taken from the juries under modern American procedures for 
defining judgments “as a matter of law” show that they are quite 
different.  Fact has become law, and as it becomes law, it is withdrawn 
from the jury. 
Markman suggests that the Supreme Court might be returning to 
a more historical view of the Seventh Amendment.  Indeed, Markman 
explicitly stated that the best method for determining what are the 
fundamental elements of the right to jury trial—the elements that are 
preserved by the Seventh Amendment—is the historical method.501  If 
the Court is serious about defining the right to jury trial historically, it 
ought to take a close look at Munson and all the cases that rely upon 
it. 
 
 501 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
